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Sixteen-year-old drug dealer Wallace wants to get out of the Baltimore City
drug trade. Orphaned and homeless, Wallace previously dropped out of school and
now wants to go back. He's tired of the drug "game" and conflicted about his role
in it. He tells this to D'Angelo, his boss and friend. Always supportive, D'Angelo
gives Wallace some money to help him get out of the business.
Shortly thereafter, however, Wallace is arrested. Still eager to get out of the
game, Wallace tells the arresting officer he is willing to give up information he
knows. He identifies three of his drug crew members who were involved in the
torture and murder of another teenager He also explains his role as the one who pointed
out the youth to the murderous thugs. To keep him safe before he testifies, the officers take
Wallace to stay with his grandmother in the Maryland countryside.
Meanwhile, Wallace's and D'Angelo's bosses, who ordered the teenager's
homicide, decide that Wallace needs to be eliminated because he can link them to
the crime. When D'Angelo's bosses ask him where Wallace is, D'Angelo tries to
protect Wallace. He assures them that Wallace is not a threat because he is no
longer in the drug business and has moved out of town.
Out in the country at his grandmother's house, Wallace is homesick and bored.
Not knowing that he's been tagged for elimination, he decides to go back to the city
projects to ask for his "job" back. When he returns, he is immediately killed by the
organization's "muscle." D'Angelo, unaware of Wallace's death, is later arrested
by officers after completing a drug run. During interrogation, officers show
D'Angelo pictures of Wallace's dead body and accuse him of not protecting his
own. D'Angelo is upset but non-responsive to their accusations. Later, when
D'Angelo's boss and the crew's lawyer visit him in jail, D'Angelo repeatedly
implores them: "Where's Wallace?" He gets no answer to his question.'
1. Wallace's story is the creation of fictional television writers. See HBO, The Wire: Episode Guide,
http://www.hbo.com/thewire/episodelseasonl/episode0l.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2009). The show's writers
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America has long had an ambivalent relationship with its children, especially
regarding criminal and juvenile justice issues. On one hand, society views children
as vulnerable incompetents requiring protection from themselves and others. Thus,
the government invokes the doctrine of parens patriae, meaning the authority of
the sovereign to protect vulnerable individuals, 2 to create and maintain juvenile
delinquency systems. On the other hand, at times, children are "adultified," i.e.,
viewed as miniature adults with similar abilities, obligations, and responsibilities.
This contrasting view is exemplified when the government transfers juveniles to
adult criminal court for prosecution, rather than adjudicating the matter in juvenile
delinquency court.
America's "wars" on drugs, crime, and gangs have exacerbated this tension-
filled relationship. The government has waged these "wars" to protect the public's
safety from these perceived threats. To that end, it exercises its police power to
adopt aggressive strategies and tactics to investigate and prosecute crimes.
However, these strategies frequently clash with the government's long-standing
commitment to protect children, pursuant to parens patriae.
One example of this clash is the government's use of juvenile informants in the
investigation and prosecution of criminal and juvenile delinquency cases.3 Within
the criminal justice system, a vibrant snitching institution operates to assist the
government in its "wars" on drugs, crime, and gangs.4 Alongside adults, govern-
ment officials enlist and conscript juveniles-some of whom are engaged in
criminal activities and some who are not-to act as informants. As a result of their
informant activities, some children have been killed.5 Others have suffered verbal
and other non-physical intimidation or have been shunned by their peers.6 Even
children who were simply suspected of being snitches have been killed.7
claim that, though characters such as Wallace are fictional, they are rooted in the reality of inner-city life. See Ed
Bums et al., Saving Cities, and Souls, TIME, Mar. 17, 2008, at 50. Indeed, Wallace's story is similar to the true-life
stories of some child informants. See discussion infra Part I.A.
2. See BLACK'S LAW DiCrnoNARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
3. Throughout the article, the terms "child informant," "juvenile informant," and "underage informant" are
used interchangeably.
4. This article interchangeably uses the term "informant" and its pejorative colloquial alternative "snitch."
5. See Williamson v. City of Va. Beach, 786 F Supp. 1238, 1241 (E.D. Va. 1992); MacDonald v. City of Brea
-Police Dep't, No. G028372,2002 WL 1650018, at * 1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 23,2002); Daren Briscoe, The New Face
of Witness Protection, NEWsWEEK, May 2, 2005, at 56; Jerry Markon & Maria Glod, Giving Up a New Life for a
Gang Death, WASH. PosT, Aug. 10, 2003, at A01; Kyra Damton, 60 Minutes: The Fight Against MS-13 (CBS
television broadcast Dec. 4, 2005), available at http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2005/1 2 01/60minutes/
main1090941.shtml.
6. JULE L. WsnmAN & ROBERT C. DAvis, THE NAT'L CTR. FOR VIcTIMS OF CRIME, SNrrcHES GeT STITcHES:
YouTH, GANGS, AND WITNaSS INTIMIDATION IN MASSACHUSEITS, 23-25, 37 (2007).
7. See Neely Tucker, Girl's Slaying Opens Window on Intimidation, WASH. POST, Feb. 2,2004, atAl ("[Slome
of the region's most dangerous criminals have made intimidating witnesses a part of doing business .... The Jan.
23 slaying of 14-year-old Jahkema Princess Hansen-a possible witness to a homicide-is a jarring
reminder....").
114720091
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The use of children as informants has been largely unacknowledged. Regula-
tions of informants generally fail to distinguish between adults and juveniles.
Similarly, legal scholarship discussing the use of informants primarily focuses on
adult informants. 8 Yet, the concerns respecting the use of juvenile informants are
different from those of adult informants and require special attention. Because of
their immaturity, underage informants raise special physical, psychological, ethi-
cal, and familial concerns.
Wallace's story, though fictional, dramatically demonstrates both the tension
between parens patriae and police power, and the need for stricter regulation of
juvenile informants. Wallace "worked" on the "front lines" in the streets of one of
America's poor inner-cities rife with drugs and violence. He was orphaned, truant,
and homeless. The government stood to gain substantially from his information
and testimony. It would have closed a homicide case and obtained the arrest of
several serious criminals long sought by the government. Wallace's motivations
for informing were complex. He at once desired to get out of a criminal lifestyle,
make amends for his involvement in a murder, and obtain criminal leniency.
Without parents and legal counsel, however, his agreement to inform and actions
thereafter were unguided and misguided. Ultimately, his decision cost him his
street "family" and his life.
The police and prosecutor in Wallace's case, however, gave little weight to the
particular vulnerabilities of child informants in comparison to their desire to
investigate and prosecute crimes. In assuming a war-like approach to solving
domestic social problems, the government abdicated its protector function vis-A-
vis children and instead embraced a bunker, ends-justify-the-means mentality.9 To
8. A growing body of literature discusses adult informants. E.g., George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The
Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 1 (2000); Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation
in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1992); Alexandra Natapoff, Comment, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches
Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 107 (2006) [hereinafter Natapoff, Unreliable];
Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CN. L. REv. 645 (2004)
[hereinafter Natapoff, Snitching]; Richard Rosenfeld et al., Snitching and the Code of the Street, 43 BRrr. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 291 (2003); Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement,
56 VAND. L. REv. 1 (2003); Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BuFF. L. REv. 563 (1999).
In comparison, only a handful of articles from the year 2000 and earlier discuss juvenile informants. See Darci
Osther, Juvenile Informants-A Necessary Evil?, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 106 (1999); Lee Sinclair & David L. Herbert,
The Use of Minors in Law Enforcement Undercover Operations, 24 Omo N.U. L. REv. 31 (1998); Charoletta J.
Ransom, Comment, Does the End Justify the Means? Use of Juveniles as Government Informants, Helpful to
Society While Harmful to the Child, 20 J. Juv. L. 108 (1999); Michael R. Santiago, Comment, "The Best Interests
of the Child"-Scrutinizing California's Use of Minors as Police Informants in Drug Cases, 31 McGEoRGE L.
REv. 777 (2000). This article both resurrects and moves forward the discussion ofjuvenile informants.
9. Cf Linda. S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Demonizing Youth, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 747, 747-48 (2001).
Beres and Griffith describe the situation in the following manner:
Conceptualizing the crime-control mission in military terms-"War on Drugs" and "War on
Gangs"-can encourage an "ends justifies the means" attitude. The resulting police conduct can
vary from the oft-reported false testifying of officers regarding the circumstances surrounding a
stop or search, to the more extreme case of shooting and then framing an innocent man.
1148 [Vol. 46:1145
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the government, Wallace was simply yet another crime-fighting weapon, and the
government paid little regard to the harms such use posed to his life.1°
This Article contends that governments should temper the use of juveniles as
informants by reliance on the doctrine of parens patriae. Doing so requires
consideration of the harms that juveniles experience as a result of informing, rather
than focusing solely on winning the "wars" for public safety. Consideration of the
harms in turn dictates that governments adopt an extremely conservative approach
to the use of juveniles as informants, thereby severely limiting and closely
regulating their use.
This Article is divided into three sections. Part I describes the current practice of
using children as informants. More particularly, it defines and exemplifies "child
informant," describes the government's recruitment techniques, and discusses the
prevalence of child informants. This Part also discusses the de minimis level of
regulation of child informants.
Part II describes the tension between the government's dual responsibilities to
protect child informants and promote public safety. First, the Part begins with a
discussion of how the parens patriae doctrine and general police powers have
traditionally been used to protect children. Second, it explains the government's
war-like approach to public safety challenges, exemplified by the "wars" on drugs,
crime, and gangs. Third, it analyzes the government-proffered justifications for
using underage informants to reveal the tension between the use of child infor-
mants and the government's responsibility to protect children. Finally, it utilizes a
child-centered perspective to posit harms to juveniles resulting from their use as
informants. This Part contends that these harms weigh in favor of law enforcement
agents and prosecutors adopting conservative policies regarding their use of child
informants.
Part III offers several alternative measures to ensure that children are only used
as informants in limited and reviewable circumstances. First, it proposes a
categorical age-based restriction limiting the use of underage informants. Second,
it suggests requiring judicial pre-approval before a child may act as an informant
and sketches out a procedural mechanism and alternative standards for approval,
i.e., whether it is in the best interests of the child to act as an informant or whether a
"mature minor" has given informed consent. Ultimately, the Article concludes that
governments should adopt the best interests of the child standard. The Article
closes by positing some ramifications of the limited use of children as informants.
Id.; see also James Blair, Ethics of Using Juvenile Informants, CHsrtaSAN Sci. MoNITOR, Apr. 14, 1998, at 3 ("It
goes on a lot more than people realize because of the mentality of the drug war .... It's a holy war... and so the
police use a lot of tactics that probably would shock the pubic if they came to light.")
10. Beres & Griffith, supra note 9; see also Blair, supra note 9.
11492009]
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I. OPERATING OFF THE RADAR: THE REGIMENT OF JUVENILE INFORMANTS
A. Mission Defined
An "informant" or "snitch" is any individual-whether a criminal, witness,
victim, or tipster-who provides information to government authorities for use in
investigating and prosecuting the illicit activities of another. 1 The subject or target
of information may be anyone, including, but not limited to, family members,
friends, acquaintances, co-conspirators, or unrelated individuals. 12 A "child infor-
11. "Informant" or "snitch" is a term open to various interpretations depending on the speaker and context.
Some have adopted a more narrow definition. For example, the term is frequently limited to "jailhouse snitches"
or other criminals who provide information in exchange for a government benefit. See, e.g., Natapoff, Unreliable,
supra note 8, at 107; Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 8, at 653; Simons, supra note 8, at 2. Alternatively, the term
could be defined as an individual who, being a member of a particular community, especially an alienated or
outsider community, provides information to authorities about members of that same community.
The term as used herein is intentionally broad because the concerns surrounding underage informants are not
limited to those who receive a government benefit. See infra Part II. Moreover, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
takes a broad view of the term informant. Criminals and those involved in the criminal milieu, victims, and
witnesses are all a type of informant, although victims and witnesses are usually further identified as
citizen-informants. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDuRE §§ 3.3(c), 3.3(d) (3d ed. 2007); 79
C.J.S. Searches § 215 (2008). Legal culture reflects a trend toward defining informant to include all human
sources of information, regardless of their motivations. Cf. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATroRNEY GENERAL'S
GumaLNEs REGARDING THE USE OF FBI CONFIDErIAL HuMAN SouRcEs 4 (2006) [hereinafter CONFImDENAL
SouRcE GuiDFuLtraS], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/chs-guidelines.pdf. The FBI defines
"confidential human source" as:
[A]ny individual who is believed to be providing useful and credible information to the FBI for
any authorized information collection activity, and from whom the FBI expects or intends to obtain
additional useful and credible information in the future, and whose identity, information or
relationship with the FBI warrants confidential handling.
Id.; see also Boston Police Dep't, Special Ord. No. 96-31 (1996), available at www.cityofboston.gov/police/
pdfslrule333.pdf (defining "source of information," "paid confidential informant," "defendant informant," and
"other informant"); Cincinnati Police Dep't Proc. Manual 12.131 (Rev. Feb. 1998), available at http://
www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/downloads/police-pdf3373 1.pdf (defining "sources of information," "confidential
informants," "confidential defendant informants," and "inactive confidential informants"); Denver Police Dep't
Operations Manual 307.01(1) (Rev. Mar. 2006), available at http://www.denvergov.org/DenverPoliceDepartment-
OperationsManualltabid/392273/ (defining "participating informant" and "non-participating informant"); Iowa
City Police Dep't Gen. Ord. No. 01-02 (Effective Aug. 2008), available at http://www.icgov.org/site/CMSv2/File/
policelgeneralOrders/genorder37.pdf (defining "confidential informant" and "source"); Olympia Police Dep't
Gen. Ord. 42.2.5.1 (Rev. Nov. 2003), available at www.icgov.org/site/cmsv2/file/police/generalorders/
genorder37.pdf (defining "voluntary informants" and "confidential informants"). Similarly, popular culture-
including more particularly street culture and youth culture-increasingly define "informant" expansively to
include any individual who provides information to the government for the investigation and prosecution of
another. See Whitman & Davis, supra note 6, at 37 (finding from interviews with youth that simply being seen
talking to the police, whether or not information was shared, leads to the "snitch" label).
12. E.g., United States v. McCotry, Nos. IP 06-CR-25-01-H/F, 06-CR-25-02-H/F, 2006 WL 2460757, at *1-2
(S.D. Ind. July 13, 2007) (third-grade student interviewed at school by school officials, law enforcement officers,
and school social worker provided information regarding criminal drug activity of mother and mother's
paramour); Richard v. State, 820 N.E.2d 749, 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (eight-year-old citizen informant told
school counselor about criminal drug activities on father's property which was used to obtain a search warrant);
Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 661 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 (Mass. 1996) (juvenile arrested for cocaine distribution
provided information regarding his supplier); State v. Kerr, 511 N.W.2d 586, 587 (Wis. 1994) (seventeen-year-old
1150 [Vol. 46:1145
HeinOnline -- 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1150 2009
2009] CoLLATERAL DAMAGE
mant" or "juvenile informant" is simply an informant who is under the age of
eighteen years.
13
The government relies on child informants in an assortment of criminal cases
ranging from the less serious to more serious. On one end of the spectrum, since
the 1980s, children have been used to identify retailers who sell alcohol to
minors.14 In the 1990s, the federal government's Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration ("SAMHSA") expressly sanctioned the use of
children as informants in the investigation and prosecution of tobacco cases.15
At the other end of the spectrum, government officials use juvenile informants
to investigate and prosecute more serious matters including gun, drug, burglary,
sex abuse, and violent crime cases. 16 For example, a South Carolina law enforce-
ment official publicly acknowledged creating a program-"Gunstoppers"-
designed to induce children to provide tips about individuals possessing guns and
encouraged other law enforcement agencies to do the same.17 In Kentucky, a
sixteen-year-old sued the City of Covington alleging that law enforcement officers
forced him to engage in undercover acts of homosexual solicitation in furtherance
citizen informant working as desk clerk at a motel provided information to law enforcement supporting search
warrant for motel room).
13. For other definitions of juvenile informant see Osther, supra note 8, at 108-09; Sinclair & Herbert, supra
note 8, at 33-34.14. See, e.g., True N. Energy, L.L.C. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, No. 07AP-393, 2007 WL.3293349 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 8, 2007) (underage informant unlawfully obtained alcohol); State v. Lutz, No. CA-81-18, 1982 .WL
3043 (Ohio Ct. App. July 12, 1982) (juvenile informant purchased alcohol from a beer carryout store).
15. See Public Health Service Act of 1992 § 1926, 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (2000) (commonly called the "Synar
Amendment"). SAMHSA suggested, but did not require, that law enforcement use juveniles to conduct stings. 61
Fed. Reg. 1492, 1494 (1996). SAMHSA, nevertheless, suggested that sting operations employing juveniles are
the most efficient means of inspection and stated that it knew of no other alternative means of satisfying
inspection requirements. See Sinclair & Herbert, supra note 8.
16. E.g., United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 2006) (juvenile informant provided
information that defendant was a firearms dealer and gang member); United States v. Payne, 341 F.3d 393, 396
(5th Cir. 2003) (seventeen year-old victim of child sexploitation, who had been arrested on unrelated credit card
abuse charge, provided information in support of search warrant of defendant's home); United States v. Moore, 92
F.3d 1183 (4th Cir. 1996) (juvenile arrested for illegal possession of a handgun was recruited to act as informant
and participated in controlled buys); United States v. Taylor, 302 F. Supp. 2d 909, 914 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (juvenile
who associated with defendant provided information linking defendant to homicide and robbery at the
encouragement of a parent); Morrow v. State, 704 P.2d 226, 228 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (juvenile who confessed
to attempted drug distribution informed against supplier providing testimony in support of search warrant);
Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90, 101 (Fla. 1993) (sixteen-year-old who had been arrested for drug distribution was
recruited by law enforcement for participation in a "sting" to uncover the sale of pornography to minors); State v.
Hendrex, 865 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that juvenile informant, who was known to
police and had provided information in the past, provided credible information supporting probable cause to
arrest); People v. Potts, 374 N.E.2d 891, 893 (111. App. Ct. 1978) (juvenile informant allegedly involved in
homicide provided information supporting arrest warrant for another juvenile); State v. Krajeski, 16 P.3d 69, 71
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (juvenile informant provided information regarding theft of bicycle from store); State v.
Carver, 753 P.2d 569, 570 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (ten-year-old and eight-year-old child informants provided
information supporting search warrant application for neighbors' home for criminal drug activity).
17. For more discussion of the program, see infra text accompanying notes 55-59.
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of a law enforcement sting operation. 18 He had been involved with drugs.19 He
alleged that he was forced to participate in the sting without parental knowledge or
permission and as a result "sustained severe psychological damage. 2 0
Some instances of the government using juvenile informants have had deadly
results. In California, Chad MacDonald acted as an underage informant in a drug
case. His mother unsuccessfully sued the City of Brea Police Department after
Chad was tortured and killed by gang members upon whom he had informed.2'
Police had arrested Chad on charges of drug distribution, and he offered to provide
information to "correct" his mistakes.22 His arresting officer asked if he would
identify his suppliers in exchange for dismissal of the pending charges.2 3 Chad's
mother learned of this agreement only after it was made and Chad had already
begun to provide information.24 Chad's mother faced a dilemma: on one hand, she
was afraid that Chad would be incarcerated if he did not continue to cooperate, but
she alternately feared that the individuals he informed on would seek retribution
for his betrayal. 25 Eventually, she acquiesced to the police using him as an
informant, hoping that they would protect him on both accounts.2 6 To have his
charges dismissed, Chad provided information regarding drug dealers and helped
set up "drug busts.",27 Eventually, individuals began to threaten Chad.28 About a
month later, gang members tortured and killed him.29
Seventeen-year-old Robbie Williamson contacted the City of Virginia Beach,
Virginia, police department and volunteered to provide information regarding the
illegal drug activities of others. 3' The City accepted Robbie's offer and used him as
an informant without obtaining parental permission or completing a background
check. Robbie committed suicide after he was threatened by the individuals upon
whom he had informed. His mother filed suit against the City of Virginia Beach,
alleging claims based on the City's use of Robbie as an informant. 3 ' The case
18. Martin v. City of Covington, 541 F Supp. 803, 803 (E.D. Ky. 1982); see also Munoz, 629 So. 2d at 101
(sixteen-year-old who had been arrested for drug distribution was recruited by law enforcement for participation
in a "sting" to uncover the sale of pornography to minors).
19. Martin, 541 F Supp. at 803.
20. Id. at 804.
21. MacDonald v. City of Brea Police Dep't, No. G028372, 2002 WL 1650018 (Cal. Ct. App. July 23, 2002).
22. Id.
23. Id. at *1-2. The local prosecutor handling Chad's case agreed with the deal. Id. at *3.
24. Id. at *2.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *2-3.
28. Il His tires were slashed and a phone caller threatened that his informant activities "would cost him his
life." Id. at *2.
29. Id. at *4. Prior to his murder, Chad had been terminated as an informant and his police handler refused to
request the prosecutor grant Chad leniency. Id. at *3.
30. See Williamson v. City of Virginia Beach, 786 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (E.D. Va. 1992).
31. Id. at 1241-42.
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reportedly settled. 3 2
Finally, when Virginia law enforcement officers arrested sixteen-year-old Brenda
Paz, she began to inform on the Latin gang Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), which
eventually led to her death.33 Police arrested Brenda on car theft charges. 34 Despite
the relatively minor nature of that crime, she was able to provide information to
federal law enforcement agents and police officers from other states regarding
MS-13 gang leaders and members whom she had known intimately since she was a
pre-teen. 35 Slated to be a witness at a murder trial against MS- 13 members, federal
agents put her into the federal witness protection program.36 She did not remain
there, however, as she later rejoined her gang family.37 After learning she had
informed on them, MS-13 members killed her.38
Ultimately, law enforcement and prosecutors use the information provided by
child informants in a number of ways. Government officials may collect the
information and place it in an investigatory case file to use it passively to identify
other suspects or avenues of investigation or prosecution.39 More affirmatively, the
police use the information for securing or justifying a search or arrest warrant.4° At
32. See Stuart Pfeifer et al., O.C. Teen Informer Case Has Parallels, ORANGE CouNTY REG., Mar. 29, 1998, at
A01.
33. See Paul Bradley, Gang Member's Story is Recounted After Leaving Witness Program, She Returned to
MS-13, Was Killed, RICH. Ttams DISPATCH, Apr. 13, 2005, at B1; Markon & Glod, supra note 5; Jerry Markon &
Jamie Stockwell, U.S. Faulted in Slaying of Witness, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2005, at B01; Jamie Stockwell, In
MS-13, a Culture of Brutality and Begging, WASH. POST, May 2, 2005, at AO1; Darnton, supra note 5; News
Release, U.S. Att'y, E. Dist. of Va. (May 17, 2005)..
34. Markon & Glod, supra note 5.
35. Id.
36. Id. The federal government has placed other teens into the program. See Briscoe, supra note 5.
37. Markon & Glod, supra note 5. One can speculate on the reasons a juvenile in Brenda's position would
initiate contact with those on whom she was informing and she knew to be dangerous, including peer pressure,
loneliness, boredom, naivete, high tolerance for risk-taking, or a high level of attachment.
38. Id.
39. E.g., United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006) (juvenile informant provided information that
defendant was a firearms dealer and gang member); People v. Thames, 483 N.Y.S.2d 583 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984)
(two-year-old child used as informant in homicide case); State v. Clinton, No. 35225-7-11, 2008 WL 186740
(Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2008) (ten- and twelve-year-old girls acting provided information supporting Terry stop);
State v. Hart, 830 P.2d 696 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (juvenile detained for traffic infraction and possession of an
open container of alcohol provided information regarding marijuana distributor).
40. E.g., United States v. Payne, 341 F3d 393 (5th Cir. 2003) (seventeen-year-old victim of child sexploitation,
who had been arrested on unrelated credit card abuse charge, provided information in support of search warrant of
defendant's home); People v. Fredrics, 395 N.E.2d 723 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (eleven-year-old child informant who
was crime victim provided information in support of search warrant); Richard v. State, 820 N.E.2d 749 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005) (eight-year-old informant told school counselor about criminal drug activities on father's property);
State v. Jannetta, 355 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (twelve-year-old child informant who was crime victim
provided information in support of search warrant); State v. Brush, No. M1999-00622-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL
378315 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 14, 2000) (three-year-old sex abuse victim provided information for search
warrant of defendant's home); State v. Carver, 753 P.2d 569 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (ten-year-old and eight-
year-old child informants provided information supporting search warrant application for neighbors' home for
criminal drug activity); State v. Kerr, 511 N.W.2d 586 (Wis. 1994) (seventeen-year-old informant working as desk
clerk provided information to law enforcement supporting search warrant for motel room).
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the extreme, a child may be expected to perform undercover activities or testify in
court proceedings.41
B. Recruitment Efforts
Any number of concerns, working individually or collectively, may be influen-
tial in a child's agreement to inform. Children are often motivated by internal
factors relating to their own criminal activity or victim-hood and external sources
such as parents or law enforcement. Often their motivations are mixed and
complex.
Parental input can play a factor in whether a child informs. A child who is
accused of criminal activity may consult a parent when making decisions about a
case, particularly whether to talk to the police.4 2 Such consultation offers parents
the opportunity to approve a child's individual desire to inform and encourage or
instruct a hesitant or unwilling child to cooperate.43 Some parents, however, will
counsel their child not to inform.44
Pressure from law enforcement is a significant factor in a child's decision to
become an informant. Criminologist Dr. Mary Dodge collected qualitative social
science data suggesting that the government's persuasive efforts can be character-
ized as undue influence, because of either the particular vulnerabilities of children
or the nature of the efforts to convince children to inform.45 A study by law
professor Professor Barry Feld provides greater insight into the desire of law
enforcement officials to convince juveniles facing criminal prosecution to act as
informants and the lengths to which the officers will go to accomplish their goal. In
2006, Feld published a quantitative and qualitative study regarding routine law
enforcement interrogation of juveniles sixteen years of age or older in Minne-
41. E.g., Hong v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 165 F. App'x 995 (3d Cir. 2006) (asserting that fifteen-year-old boy
provided information to government and agreed to testify at trial regarding international illegal smuggling
operation run by Chinese gang).
42. See 3 THOMAS G~isso, JuvENILEs' WAIVER OF RIGHTS 182-86 (1981) (studying parent-child interactions
during juvenile interrogations).
43. See id. at 182 (concluding that most parents who advised a child on whether to cooperate with police
interrogation about criminal involvement told the child to cooperate); Pfeifer et al., supra note 32 (quoting father
of Gregory "Sky" Erikson, a juvenile informant who was murdered, as stating: "I feel responsible because I talked
him into this .... ).
44. See GlIsso, supra note 42, at 182 (concluding that a small percentage of parents advised their child not to
cooperate with law enforcement interrogation).
45. See Mary Dodge, Juvenile Police Informants: Friendship, Persuasion, and Pretense, 4 YOUTH VIoLENcE &
JUV. JUST. 234, 240 (2006) ("[Al high level of coercion is generally present in the recruitment of the juvenile
turned informant."); cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 51-52 (1967):
[l]t seems probable that where children are induced to confess by "paternal" urgings on the part of
officials and the confession is then followed by disciplinary action, the child's reaction is likely to
be hostile and adverse - the child may well feel that he has been led or tricked into confession and
that despite his confession, he is being punished.
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sota.46 The juveniles had been charged with felony offenses and had waived their
Miranda rights.4 7 The aim of Feld's research was to produce empirical data
regarding juvenile competence during police interrogations.48 The study also
revealed, however, law enforcement efforts to recruit juvenile informants. In about
thirteen percent of the interrogations reviewed, juveniles were reticent about,
though apparently not adamantly against, informing on co-offenders.4 9 For those
juveniles who exhibited a potential willingness to provide information, the
interrogator engaged in a variety of tactics designed to overcome the hesitation.
Feld's study revealed that various types of reward and punishment were used to
induce children to become informants. To reward potential juvenile informants, in
one case, officers assured juvenile suspects that prosecutors and judges would
react favorably if they cooperated and helped recover evidence.50 In another case,
law enforcement offered an immediate release from pre-trial detention if the
juvenile assisted.51 To punish a reticent juvenile informant, law enforcement
threatened the juvenile with adult criminal charges.5E Even more extreme is the
case involving an officer who threatened to detain the juvenile's sister if he did not
cooperate with the investigation.53 Law enforcement pressure may be exerted in a
more benign way. For example, in response to a juvenile's hesitation about
providing information, an interrogator in Feld's study advised the juvenile that
friendship should be put aside, that the juvenile had to take care of himself first
because no one else would, and that failing to cooperate could result in more
severe consequences for the juvenile.
54
The government also incentivizes children to inform by offering monetary
payment for their information.55 For example, in 1996, Reuben Greenberg, then
Chief of Police of the Charleston South Carolina Police Department, spoke
46. Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRiM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 219 (2006). Feld is not the first to examine juvenile interrogations. In the mid to late 1970s,
psychiatrist Thomas Grisso gathered similar data in St. Louis, Missouri. See generally Grisso, supra note 42.
Grisso was researching juveniles' "understanding of the meaning and significant of the rights to silence and
counsel." Id. at 8.
47. Feld, supra note 46, at 220.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 275.
50. Id. at 282-85.
51. Id. at 301-302.
52. Id. at 298-302. Given the increasing numbers and rate of children transferred to adultcriminal court and the
severity of the penalties available in adult criminal court, the incentive to inform in order to avoid adult
prosecution may be great.
53. Id. at 276.
54. Id. at 275.
55. See Reuben Greenberg, Solving the Problem: Rehabilitation, Reformation, and Other Solutions, 23 Pan'.
L. Rv. 909, 915-916 (1996) (discussing how the Charleston Police Department "decided to give one hundred
dollars to anybody who reported someone who had an illegal gun in public"); see also Susan DeFord, Fur Flies
After School Food Fight, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2008, at BO1 (describing offer of principal of a Maryland county
high school to give thirty dollars to students who provided the names of those students earlier involved in a food
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publicly regarding his agency's efforts to reduce crime committed by and againstjuveniles.56 Among other programs, he described the Gunstoppers Program.
Gunstoppers was a gun reporting program that provided one hundred dollars to
individuals who provided law enforcement with detailed information regarding
individuals carrying guns-a so-called "hot tip."'57 Greenberg admitted the pro-
gram was aimed at juveniles, whom he deemed "the greatest snitches in the
world .... [Y]ou tell them they are going to get a hundred bucks, then they
become super snitches with respect to other kids having guns and so forth., 58 Thejuveniles wanted immediate compensation, so law enforcement developed a
system to compensate them the same day they reported a hot tip.5 9
Intangible personal desires can also factor into a child's reason for informing.
Children are more likely than adults to engage in thrill-seeking behaviors, owing to
decreased risk aversion.6° Such thrill-seeking may explain why juvenile infor-
mants who are not involved in criminal activity volunteer to act as informants. 61
Moreover, redemption and the desire to change one's life may play a role in the
decision. Thus, for example, the government suggested that Brenda Paz willingly
informed in order to turn her life around and leave MS-13.62 A juvenile may also
inform to avoid law enforcement retribution-that is, to keep law enforcement
from harassing him either at the time or in the future.63 Finally, some-in
particular the tipster, victim, or witness child informant-may inform out of a
sense of civic responsibility or personal safety.
C. Deployment Levels
The extent to which the government uses juvenile informants is difficult to
fight in the school cafeteria); Susan DeFord, Offer of Cash Continues for Informants, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2008,
at B05 (discussing school administrators offering cash to students for informing on their classmates).
56. Greenberg, supra note 55, at 909.
57. Id. at 915-16.
58. Id. at 916.
59. Id.
60. Dodge, supra note 45, at 236 (noting that most law enforcement agencies are "reluctant to officially admit
to the practice" of using underage informants); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (describinghow juveniles' lack of maturity and other qualities often result in "impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions").
61. See Pfeifer et al., supra note 32 (describing the case of Cecil Calloway, a murdered juvenile informant,
whom police said "walked in and just volunteered .... We didn't have any charges on him, he wasn't working
anything off; he just came in off the street and wanted to help us. He just said he wanted to get the drugs off the
street."); see also rdliamson v. City of Virginia Beach, 786 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Va. 1992) (discussing case in
which mother of Robbie Williamson, a volunteer juvenile informant, sued city officials for damages owing to his
suicide).
62. See Bradley, supra note 33 (FBI witness protection handier for one juvenile who was killed by the targets
of her informing activities stated his responsibility "was to provide her with a safe place to live and food and
sustenance .... The burden of personal responsibility for safety [fell] upon the witness.").63. Cf Beres & Griffith, supra note 9, at 760 (pointing out, in the context of gang databases, that "[y]ouths
stopped and questioned by the police may fear retaliation if they refuse to answer the question asked or if they
deny permission to be photographed").
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quantify for a number of reasons. First, law enforcement and prosecutorial
communities disagree over whether the practice even occurs, and if so, with what
frequency. Some law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies do not admit the
practice occurs at all.64 Others say that the use of children is "negligible. ' t In
contrast, others willingly acknowledge that their use is "frequent" or "higher than
many think.
' 66
More importantly, no government agency tracks the use of juvenile infor-
mants.6 ' Even if agencies tracked their use, however, government authorities may
distort or conceal the number.68 The fact that law enforcement and prosecutors
inconsistently define the term informant contributes to minimization. Some law
enforcement officers distinguish the informal use of juveniles for information
gathering from the formal use of them as informants by characterizing some
juvenile informants as "friends" who voluntarily give information.69 In exchange,
law enforcement may do "friendly favors" for the child (e.g., job placement, buy
diapers, find babysitters).7° Confidentiality also imposes barriers to tracking the
government's use of informants. Police are in general loathe to reveal the use of
informants, preferring to keep their use a secret.7 1 Moreover, the use of child
informants may remain concealed within the realm of highly discretionary and
confidential juvenile court filings and proceedings that cannot be studied without
special dispensation.72
64. See Dodge, supra note 45, at 243. In this article, Dodge sets forth results from a qualitative study of law
enforcement perspectives on the use of juvenile snitches. She notes that the "low number of participants limits
generalizability and may not reflect majority perspectives in other cities, though consistent themes were identified
among this group of respondents." Id. at 239; see also Blair, supra note 9 (noting that after a juvenile informant
was killed, the Brea Police Department "maintained that Chad took part voluntarily and that they were not
responsible for his death").
65. See Blair, supra note 9 (quoting prosecutor who says use of child informants is "very infrequent"); Dodge,
supra note 45, at 235 (quoting officer who says use of child informants is "negligible").
66. See Blair, supra note 9 (citing former police chief who thinks that "the number of underage operatives
being used may be higher than many think"); Dodge, supra note 45, at 235 (citing commentators who "claim the
use of underage operatives is frequent").
67. Data on adult informants is likewise not routinely and widely collected. See Natapoff, Snitching, supra
note 8, at 654. The United States Sentencing Commission occasionally collects data on the use of adult
cooperators in the federal criminal justice system. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N., SOuRCEBOOK of FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTCS tbl. 25 (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/SBTOC07.htm (stating
that 0.5% of cooperating offenders received a downward sentence from the guideline range); see also LINDA
DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER, NAT'L INST. OF CORR., SuBsTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL
YARDSTICK GAUGING EQuHny IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 9 (1998) ("Approximately two-thirds
(67.5% or 158 of the 234 cases with available data) of all defendants provided some form of assistance to the
government during prosecution.").
68. Dodge, supra note 45, at 239.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 8, at 657 ("Police jealously guard the identities of their informants,
often failing to reveal that an informant has contributed to a case.").
72. See Dodge, supra note 45, at 235 (noting that the secrecy surrounding the use ofjuvenile informants is "connected
to the particular rights of minors, the confidentiality of juvenile records"); Osther, supra note 8, at 107.
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Despite the discrepant information regarding the scope of use of child infor-
mants, the practice exists in more than just a few, isolated instances. As early as the
late 1960s, appellate courts in criminal cases have characterized children as
informants.73 Since that time, opinions referencing juvenile informants can readily
be found. 4 Additionally, news reports confirm that their use is more than rare.
Beginning in the late 1990s and continuing today, reporters have recounted stories
of juveniles who were killed for informing. 75 Finally, recent empirical studies have
begun to confirm their more than infrequent use. Professor Dodge's qualitative
study was directed at exploring the practice and revealed that it is occurring,
although the levels may be debatable, and Professor Feld's data on police
interrogation of juveniles revealed quantitatively and qualitatively that law enforce-
ment officers interrogating juvenile suspects seek to convince the juvenile to act as
an informant (i.e., "flip" the minor). 76 While Dodge's study was limited in scope
and Feld's study was both limited in scope and not focused on studying juvenile
informants, it is reasonable to infer from their data that the attempted and actual
use of child informants is more than minimal.
The lack of collected data regarding child informants creates difficulty in
determining the characteristics of underage informants. Without study, the types of
cases involving and endeavors undertaken by juvenile informants cannot be
known. Additionally, the demographic characteristics of the group are unclear. The
lack of social science studies of juvenile informants also makes it difficult to
understand the actual impact of informing on juvenile informants. Further study is
needed to develop these types of information.77
D. Operating Procedures
There are no national guidelines on the use of juvenile informants by prosecu-
tors. The United States Attorney General's guidelines for federal prosecutors do
not specifically regulate the use of children as confidential informants in federal
cases.78 The National District Attorneys' Association has not suggested the
73. Pollock v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. App. 2d 548, 555-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (stating that juvenile who
was arrested for, and admitted to, burglary informed on the individual to whom he sold the stolen items).
74. See cases cited supra notes 16, 39-41.
75. See Blair supra note 9; Pfeifer et al., supra note 32; Stockwell supra note 33.
76. See Dodge, supra note 45; Feld, supra note 46, at 275 (noting that in 13% of cases juveniles were reluctant
to inform and officers used varying strategies to overcome their reluctance). See supra Part I.B for a discussion of
"flipping" tactics.
77. Short of a full-blown empirical study, one method to generate such information may be to extrapolate from
data on juvenile victims and offenders. In 2006, the federal government issued a report providing comprehensive,
nationwide data on juvenile crime, which may serve as a source of information on the demographics of juvenile
criminals and criminal activity. HowARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SIcKMU~ND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND Vic-rims: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 125-52 (2006).
78. See CONFImENTAL SOURCE Gum.ItNas, supra note 11. Indeed, the terms "juvenile" or "minor" appear
nowhere in the guidelines.
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adoption of such guidelines.79
Like prosecutors, law enforcement agencies as a whole have not established
formal regulations on the use of juvenile informants.80 Some individual law
enforcement agencies, however, have adopted regulations. Commonly, these
regulations limit the use of children to "extraordinary" or "critical" circumstances,
and require parental permission, waiver of liability, or approval by the supervisor
of the law enforcement handler.81 At least one agency's guidelines require juvenile
court approval or parental consent for juvenile informants who are granted
anonymity or compensation, but the guidelines do not set out specifics for
obtaining that approval.82
Some jurisdictions have adopted state-wide guidelines particularly addressing
the use of child informants. Unfortunately, they are anomalies. First, in 1997, the
New Jersey Attorney General issued "Law Enforcement Guidelines on the Use of
Juveniles as Informants" to supplement New Jersey's general guidelines on the use
of informants. 83 The juvenile-specific guidelines do not apply to underage wit-
nesses, investigative targets, or operatives in tobacco stings, none of whom are
considered informants.8 4 Further, under no circumstances may law enforcement
use a child under twelve years of age as an informant.85 Law enforcement can use
children under sixteen years of age a very limited basis.86 One exception arises
when the "illegal activity is occurring regularly among a group of juveniles under
the age of 16. "87 In addition to age, other factors limit the use of juveniles. First,
children undergoing drug and/or alcohol counseling may not be recruited.
8 8
Second, children who have a mental or physical illness may not be used.89 Third,
in recruiting juvenile informants, law enforcement officers may not "make any
promises, express or implied, with regard to prosecution without first obtaining the
79. Blair, supra note 9. On January 23, 2008, the author submitted an online information request through the
National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) website inquiring whether the organization had such regula-
tions. On January 24, 2008, the author received a voice message from Susan Broderick of the NDAA-Juvenile
Section confirming that the NDAA does not have any regulations.
80. See Blair, supra note 9.
81. See, e.g., Boston Police Dep't supra note 11; Cincinnati Police Dep't, supra note 11, at 12.131(C)(1)(a);
Denver Police Dep't, supra note 11, § 307.04(1); Iowa City Police Dep't supra note 11, § IV.E; Olympia Police
Dep't, supra note 11.
82. Olympia Police Dep't, supra note I l(requiring juvenile court approval for use of juveniles as confidential
informants).
83. N.J. ATr'Y GEN., LAW ENFORCEMENT GuirmELws ON THE USE OF JUVENILES AS INFORMANTS [hereinafter
N.J. JuVENILE GuIDELuNE], reprinted in THE NEw JERSEY SCHOOL SEARCH POLICY MANUAL A 10-1 (1998).
84. See id. These exclusions make New Jersey's definition of informant narrower than the definition adopted
herein. See supra Part I.A.
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express approval of the prosecutor or his designee. ' 9° Fourth, a child may not
make a controlled buy or act as an undercover operative unless law enforcement
has "obtain[ed] written authorization from the county prosecutor, the Attorney
General, or their designee." 91 Finally, prior to acting as an informant, both the
child and the child's parent must consent in writing, and waive liability.92
The second set of statewide regulations came in 1998, when, after Chad
MacDonald was killed by gang members on whom he had informed, the California
legislature enacted a criminal procedure statute conditioning the use of minors as
informants.9 3 California's statute defines a "minor informant" as a child who
participates, on behalf of a law enforcement agency, in a prearranged transac-
tion or series of prearranged transactions with direct face-to-face contact with
any party, when the minor's participation in the transaction is for the purpose
of obtaining or attempting to obtain evidence of illegal activity by a third party
and where the minor is participating in the transaction for the purpose of
reducing or dismissing a pending juvenile petition against the minor.94
Essentially, an informant is a juvenile who engages in undercover activities at the
behest of law enforcement in exchange for criminal leniency for pending juvenile
delinquency charges.95 A child who simply provides information without engaging
in undercover activities is not a "minor informant." Neither is a child whose
incentive is monetary or something other than criminal leniency for a juvenile
petition. The statute does not regulate these types of informing. California
absolutely bans government authorities from using children under the age of
twelve years as informants.96 Children older than twelve years of age may be used
only with prior court approval, unless they are involved in a tobacco sting
program.
97
Before ordering that a child may act as a "minor informant," a court must
consider the child's age and maturity, the gravity of the offense filed against him,
the public's safety, and the "interests of justice. 98 The court must also find that the




93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 701.5 (West 2006) (commonly called "Chad's Law"). For scholarly discussion of the
legislation, see Santiago, supra note 8, at 782-83 (noting the arguments for and against the California statute). See
also Osther, supra note 8, at 124-26 (critiquing the use of age and maturity as the only guiding factors for the
capacity of the child to inform).
94. § 701.5(e).
95. The California definition is significantly narrower than the definition of informant adopted in this article.
See supra Part I.A.
96. § 701.5(e). The original legislation sought to ban all juveniles from acting as "minor informants," but law
enforcement officials successfully defeated this measure. See E. Bailey, Law Signed Limiting Use of Youth
Informants, L.A. Th, ms, Sept. 26, 1998, at B04.
97. § 701.5(b).
98. § 701.5(c). On its face, the statute does not require the court to hold a hearing to make such a determination.
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mant.99 In addition to consideration of the enumerated factors, the court must
ensure several conditions have been satisfied. The court must find probable cause
that the juvenile's charged offense was committed; 1" advise the child of the
mandatory minimum and maximum sentence exposures;1 °1 and inform the minor
of benefits he is to receive by cooperating. 102 Finally, excepting instances in which
the parent or guardian is the target of information, the court must confirm that the
child's parent or guardian has consented to the informant activities. 
103
To investigate and prosecute a wide range of crimes from the less serious to
most serious, police and prosecutors turn to underage informants with knowledge
of criminal activity among adults and juveniles. Their use, however, has largely
gone unrecognized, unexplored, and unregulated. At times the government uses
children simply as information sources and at other times goes so far as to employ
them to actively gather information, make introductions, or conduct undercover
buys of contraband. If necessary, the government may require an underage
informant to testify in criminal proceedings. Children agree act as informants
because of governmental persuasion through offers of leniency, money, or threats.
Parental pressure and a child's own internal motivations also play a role in whether
a child will inform. Ascertaining the number and experiences of juveniles who
have served as informants is difficult because of disagreement over whether the
practice even occurs, and if so, who constitutes an informant. Additionally, no
agency routinely and methodically collects information regarding the use of
informants, whether adult or juvenile. The practice of using children as informants
is for the most part unregulated, and an examination of existing, readily available
informant regulations reveals that, whether at the federal, state, or local level, there
is generally a lack of focus on the use of juveniles as informants and an incoherent
approach to their use.
II. BORDER CONFLICT: PARENS PATR1AE, POLICE POWER, AND JUVENILE INFORMANTS
IN THE "WARS" ON DRUGS, CRIME, AND GANGS
Traditionally, jurisprudence and policy have protected children. In contempo-
rary times, however, the traditional protections accorded children have been
undercut by the government's warrior-like approach to solving the crime, gang,
and drug problems. While general recognition of this transformation in perspective
is not novel, the exploration of this transformation in the context of the govern-
ment's use of underage informants has been inadequate. This Part confronts and
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sistencies, and employs a child-centered perspective to unearth and examine some
of the unrecognized, or not yet fully explored, harms potentially experienced byjuvenile informants. The discussion ultimately suggests that governments should
take a conservative and measured approach to their use of child informants.
A. The Government as Child Protector
The government regularly acts to protect children, whether owing to its parens
patriae role or general police power function. The parens patriae doctrine permits
the state to act to protect the interests of a child.' 04 It is grounded in the belief that
children are incompetent to care for themselves and make decisions. 10 5 Thus,
children must be protected from themselves and others. In contrast to parens
patriae, the government's police power grants the government plenary authority to
promote generally the health, safety, and welfare of children, irrespective of the
interests of any particular child.10 6 While conceptually distinct, parens patriae and
general police power are often simultaneously relied upon to justify state protec-
tion of children. '0
7
The government's role as a protector of children is exemplified in many
doctrines and policies. Some examples represent a choice. to protect the child even
when in conflict with other significant rights or interests. For example, the
government's parens patriae authority permits it temporarily or permanently to
remove children from their homes to protect their health or safety, despite their
parents' substantive due process rights to raise their children. 10 8 Similarly, police
power permits the government to enact laws regulating the public conduct of
children-but not adults-in order to promote the welfare of children generally.' 0 9
Such regulations are permitted even if they interfere with the parents' free exercise
of religion and substantive due process rights respecting their children. 1 0
Other examples represent a choice to protect the child despite the potential
resulting harm to society. Juvenile delinquency is the archetypal scenario in which
such a choice is made. The juvenile delinquency system was created in the early
1900s to protect children from adult prison facilities and to improve the lives of
104. See BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
105. See Parham v. J.R, 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (upholding the commitment of a child to a mental health facility
against his will on the grounds that children are unable to make sound judgments concerning their need for
treatment and that parents are assumed to act in the best interests of their children).
106. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
107. Lois A. Weithom, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Response to Troubled and Trouble-
some Youth, 33 HoFsTRA L. REV. 1305, 1404-05 (2005).
108. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766-67 (1982) (discussing the state interest in preserving and
promoting the welfare of a child through parens patriae).
109. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 ("Against these sacred private interests ... stand the interests of society to
protect the welfare of the children .... ")
110. Id. at 167.
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dependent children.111 Thus, the system is traditionally characterized by (1)
individualized rehabilitation and treatment, (2) civil jurisdiction, (3) informal
procedure, (4) confidentiality, and (5) incarceration separate from adults. 112 Each
of these characteristics is aimed at furthering the desire to protect children and
improving their lives. Even today, as the juvenile delinquency system has been
transformed into a more punitive system, its rehabilitative aims still remain vital to
the operation of the system. In the delinquency context, the need for children to be.
protected from others and themselves, and for specific legal mechanisms to do so,
is balanced against society's interests in its safety.
The Supreme Court's recent abolition of the death penalty for minors under-
scores the importance child protection maintains in society. In Roper v. Simmons,
the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion prohibits the execution of individuals who were juveniles at the time they
committed a capital crime. 113 The Court concluded in Roper that juveniles are
demonstrably different from adults; therefore, juvenile offenders cannot be reli-.
ably classified as among the worst offenders meriting the death penalty." 4 The
Court acknowledged that there might be sufficiently mature juveniles who commit
acts depraved enough to warrant the death penalty." 5 Nevertheless, the Court
rejected this as a rationale for permitting juries, on a case-by-case basis, to
consider age as a mitigating factor. 116 The Court also rejected the argument that the
death penalty has a deterrent effect on juveniles, concluding that it is unlikely that
juveniles consider the long-term consequences their actions (i.e., capital punish-
ment). " 7 Thus, even though maintenance of the death penalty may protect society
from some harmful juvenile acts, on balance, the line drawn by the Supreme Court
favors of protection of children as a group.
B. The Government as Warrior
Claiming to act in the interest of public safety, the government sacrifices the
interests of children in order to succeed at large-scale efforts to combat domestic
social issues, which the United States government characterizes as "wars.''
1 8
111. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967); Jonathan Simon, Power Without Parents: Juvenile Justice in a
Postmodern Society, 16 CARDozo L. REV. 1363, 1384-85 (1995).
112. Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN.
L. REv. 965,970-71 (1995).
113. 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
114. Id. at 569-70.
115. Id. at 572.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 571-72.
118. For example, U.S. Presidents have declared "war" on traditional social and health issues such as poverty,
illiteracy, and cancer. The "War on Poverty" was launched by President Lyndon Johnson during his January 1964
State of the Union address to Congress. In 1971, President Nixon launched the "War on Cancer." See Dwight B.
Heath, The War on Drugs as a Metaphor in American Culture, in DRUG PoLicY AND HUMAN NATURE 279, 280
(Warren Bickel & Richard J. DeGrandpre eds., 1996).
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America has waged these domestic social wars on drugs, and its closely related
counterparts, crime and gangs. 9 In furtherance of these metaphorical wars,
federal and state governments use results-oriented tactics that increase the punitive
nature of criminal and juvenile justice policies and negatively affect children. The
negative impact of these "wars" on children is realized in the use of military tactics
and strategies to combat crime, the dramatic increase in incarceration rates and
sentences, and the use of adult criminal courts and sanctions to punish juveniles.
First, governments now rely upon military tactics and strategies for criminal
investigation and prosecution. 12 0 The federal government has devoted significant
tangible and intangible resources to state and local law enforcement agencies
seeking to convert themselves into military style forces. 12 ' Governments have
supplanted the traditional law enforcement roles of protection and investigation
with no-knock warrants, SWAT teams, and other military-style police tactics.12 2
Today, law enforcement agencies routinely employ force against individuals
suspected of criminal activity.12 3 Tragically, these uses of force have been
employed against juveniles. For instance, in November 2007, police officers in
Brooklyn, New York, shot and killed a mentally ill eighteen-year-old who had
been holding a hairbrush. 24 The teenager's mother had called 911 asking for help
with her son. 125 Police responding at the home opened fire on the teen, killing
him. 12 6 It is unclear what transpired to cause the shooting or how many bullets hit
the teen. 1
27
Second, governments have enacted legislation and policies resulting in burgeon-
ing prison populations which in turn have negatively impacted children. Between
1980 and 2005, drug arrests surged exponentially, from 581,000 to more than 1.8
119. In 1971, President Nixon commenced the modem "War on Drugs." MARK EDDY, ISSUE BRIF FOR
CONGRESS, WAR ON DRUGS: LEGISLATION IN THE 108Th CONGRESS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2003).
President Reagan continued the battle cry in October 1982 during a weekly radio address. See Kenneth B. Nunn,
Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why The "War On Drugs" Was a "War On Blacks", 6
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 386-87 (2002). Presidents Bush and Clinton maintained their efforts. The
Reagan-George H.W. Bush presidencies invoked the "War on Crime" terminology. In his 1997 State of the Union
Address, President Clinton called for legislation that "declare[d] war on gangs." President William J. Clinton,
State of the Union Address (Jan. 31, 1997) (transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLMCS/01/
3 1/sotu.clinton 1997.3/index.html).
120. Some have commented that the use of conventional war and military tactics and strategies transforms the
rhetorical war into a literal war. E.g., Heath, supra note 118, at 281; Nunn, supra note 119, at 386.
121. Nunn, supra note 119, at 404.
122. Id. at 404-09.
123. Many jurisdictions have been subject to wide-scale investigation by the United States Department of
Justice for civil rights violations. Information regarding investigations and settlements is available on the
Department of Justice website. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Div.: Special Litig. Section Documents and
Publ'ns, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/findsettle.htm#Police%20Misconduct%2OSettlements (last visited Mar.
20, 2009).
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million.' 28 The average length of prison sentences increased due to federal and
state legislation establishing mandatory minimum sentences, drug weight sentenc-
ing disparities, and lengthy sentences for recidivists.1 29 Between 1991 and 1999,
the number of children with an incarcerated parent increased, by more than
500,000, to 1.5 million.130 The incarceration of mothers has increased, causing
many children to be orphaned.13 1 The impact of these policies and trends hits poor
and/or minority populations the hardest; black children, for example, have dispro-
portionately lost their parents.
132
Third, the government increasingly treats suspected and actual juvenile offend-
ers as adults. Governments have established gang databases that amass informa-
tion regarding juveniles who are alleged or actual gang members. 133 In contraven-
tion of longstanding juvenile justice policies, children accused of criminal activities
are transferred to the adult criminal justice system where they receive adult
criminal sentences. 134 Finally, juveniles adjudicated for or convicted of sex
offenses have been subjected to sex offender registration and public disclosure. 135
C. Juvenile Informants behind Enemy Lines
The use of juvenile informants represents another collision between parens
patriae responsibilities and police power duties. On one hand, child informants
provide information that is used to investigate and solve crimes. Indeed, child
informants, like all witnesses, are a valuable tool in the criminal justice process.
Thus, the government's use of child informants promotes public safety, and
necessarily, children's individual and collective safety. In this vein, when justify-
ing its use of underage informants, the government points to their use as (1) a
necessary and efficient approach to public safety; (2) a recognition of the
individual autonomy of children; and (3) a means of promoting juvenile rehabilita-
tion. These justifications, however, are debatable. Indeed, they ring hollow in light
128. MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEAR QUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON DRUGS
AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SoCIErY 3 (2007), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/
Documents/ publications/dp_25yearquagmire.pdf (citing FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN Tm UNITED
STATES, Arrest tbl. (2005)).
129. Id. at7.
130. See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOt.A, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THERM
CHILDREN 2 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs//pub/pdf/iptc/pdf.
131. See id.; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, WOMEN IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: BRIEFING SHEETS 5 (2007),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin%5CDocuments%5Cnews%5Cwomenincj-total.pdf.
132. In 1999, approximately 1.5 million children had a parent in state or federal prison, up by more than
500,000 in 1991. MUMOLA, supra note 130, at 2. "BIack children (7.0%) were nearly 9 times more likely to have a
parent in prison than white children (0.8%)." Id.
133. For discussions of California's gang database, see Beres & Griffith, supra note 9, at 759-63; Joshua D.
Wright, The Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2 STAN. J. CIv. RTS. & Cir. LIBERTIES. 115 (2005).
134. See SNYDER & SicKMUND, supra note 77, at 186 (describing trends in judicial waivers of juveniles).
135. See, e.g., Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 111(8), 120 Stat.
587 (2006).
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of the reality facing child informants and the necessary protection children
need. 1 36 Governments are failing either to acknowledge or give due weight to the
interests and concerns of juvenile informants. Concern for the child merits equal
voice alongside the substantial state interests in crime fighting and public safety.
Juvenile informants are not simply miniature adult informants. They have special
interests and concerns needing accommodation, particularly the physical, ethical,
intra-family, and psychological harms that may result from their use as infor-
mants. 137 Ultimately, these concerns faced by underage informants suggest that
parens patriae should play a strong 'role in considerations of whether children
should be used as informants.
1. The Government's Perspective
a. Efficient and Necessary Crime-Solving Strategy
Law enforcement officers and prosecutors claim child informants are necessary
and efficient. They claim that adults cannot penetrate the world of juveniles,
law-abiding or otherwise.1 38 They suggest that adults cannot comprehend the
sub-culture of juveniles, so the need for minors is greater when minors are being
investigated.13 9 Finally, officials assert that when an adult criminal preys on
juveniles or relies on juveniles to commit crimes, only juveniles will be close
enough to the adult criminal to have incriminating information.1 4a Collectively,
these justifications signify the belief that no "practical alternative" to using
children as informants is available to achieve successful criminal prosecutions that
136. See infra Part II.C.
137. The legal problems that may arise from the use of juvenile informants, particularly facilitating criminal
conduct and delinquency, have been elsewhere discussed. See Sinclair & Herbert, supra note 8, at 35-39
(analyzing government's use of child informants as violation of alcohol, tobacco, and drug laws as well as
contributing to the delinquency of a minor). One additional consideration may be whether the government's
actions constitute abuse and neglect of children because of the potential serious harm that may result from being
an informant. See Letter from David L. Armstrong, Att'y Gen., Ky., to Hon. R. Hughes Walker, General Counsel,
Cabinet for Human Resources, 1985 WL 193277 (1985) (advising that police use of juveniles in child sex abuse
sting could constitute abuse under child welfare laws).
138. See Blair, supra note 9 (explaining that using teen informants can sometimes be the only way to enter a
world where only minors are trusted); Dodge, supra note 45, at 235; see also N.J. JUVENILE GUIDELINES, supra
note 83, at 88 ("Juvenile informants should be used only when there is no practicable alternative that will enable a
law enforcement agency to end an illegal activity is endangering the community."). Despite such claims, in 2006,
a female, undercover law enforcement officer in Falmouth, Massachusetts, posed as a student in the local high
school. During her stint, she was able to purchase marijuana and ecstasy from other students, leading to the arrest
of those students. See Brian Ballou, Officer Posing as High Schooler Leads Drug Sting, BosToN GLOBE, Apr. 8,
2006, at Al.
139. Dodge, supra note 45, at 235.
140. See id.; see also N.J. JUVENILE GuDELINs, supra note 83, at 88 ("Juvenile informants should be used
only when there is no practicable alternative that will enable a law enforcement agency to end an illegal activity
that is endangering the community."); Blair, supra note 9; Ransom, supra note 8, at 108 ("Law enforcement is
made up of the adult population, therefore it is faced with a dilemma when attempting to infiltrate criminal activity
conducted by juveniles.").
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protect public safety. 14 1 Consequently, law enforcement officers are simply doing
"good police work" when they vigorously recruit juveniles as informants. 142
Granted, testimonial witnesses are fundamental to the criminal justice system.
Without information and testimony from witnesses, many criminal cases would
not be solved, and the criminal justice system would come to a virtual standstill.
The system's reliance on witnesses is not boundless, however. On occasion,
prosecutors prioritize substantially competing interests over protecting public
safety. One such instance involves the protection of child sexual abuse victim-
witnesses. Children who have suffered sexual abuse can experience additional
trauma, if required to testify in court in front of the alleged perpetrator.1 43 When
handling child sex abuse cases, prosecutors weigh (1) the interest in not causing
additional harm to the child by forcing her to testify against the defendant and (2)
the desire to protect children and society from the defendant. The balancing is
made all the more difficult because the child may be the only witness to the crime,
and there may not be other admissible physical or corroborating evidence. 1" The
Supreme Court has authorized prophylactic measures aimed at preventing harm to
the child victim while testifying in the defendant's presence. 145 In some instances,
however, the measure may be ineffective at preventing harm, or even if effective,
the prosecutor may nevertheless choose not to call the child to testify. In such
circumstances, if the child does not testify, a jury may acquit the defendant or the
government may choose to dismiss the case against the defendant. 146 The defen-
dant remains free, possibly jeopardizing public safety.
b. Juveniles Are Miniature Adults
Some government agents claim that permitting children to act as informants
respects the individual autonomy of children, particularly those children who are
141. See N.J. JUVENILE GuiDELnuEs, supra note 83, at 88 (the use of juveniles as informants "may be necessary
to protect juveniles in a community from the distribution of controlled dangerous substances, the sale of firearms,
or gang activity"); Blair, supra note 9; Dodge, supra note 45, at 244.
142. See Dodge, supra note 45, at 240.
143. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 854-55 (1990).
144. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) ("Child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to
detect and prosecute, in large part because there are often no witnesses except the victim."). Additionally, current
Supreme Court precedent makes it difficult for the government to admit as trial evidence the child's out-of-court
statements regarding the abuse. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004) (explaining that statements
of witness absent from trial may only be admitted "where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the
defendant has had prior opportunities to cross-examine"). But see Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington:
Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RIcH. L. REV. 511, 591-92 (2005) (discussing a
hearsay exception that "any and all hearsay describing 'an act of sexual conduct with or on the child' is admissible
if the child 'testifies at the proceeding and is subject to cross-examination').
145. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 836 (holding use of one-way closed circuit television that prevents a child from
testifying face-to-face with the defendant does not violate Confrontation Clause).
146. On remand from the Supreme Court, the government in Maryland v. Craig dismissed the case reportedly
because the parents did not want their children to have to testify in a second trial. See Stephen Buckley,
Prosecutors Reject New Trial in Sandra Craig Abuse Case, WASH. POST, July 3, 1991, at C 1.
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adolescents or are "mature.', 147 This justification suggests that child informants are
no different from adult informants, whose use is generally accepted. In support of
this rationale, many will point to data suggesting that adolescents as young as
fourteen years of age engage in the same decision-making process as adults and are
thus competent decision-makers and of equal culpability. 148 Alternatively, in some
instances, law enforcement will characterize particular juveniles as street-savvy,
criminal-minded, de facto adults.' 49 It is proclaimed that because children with
criminal histories have repeatedly engaged in criminal, i.e., adult behaviors, they
should be treated as adults and allowed to inform without limitation.
Such beliefs were evidenced in Brenda Paz's case. After her death, Brenda's
witness protection handler remarked that his responsibility "was to provide her
with a safe place to live and food and sustenance .... The burden of personal
responsibility for safety [fell] upon [Brenda]."' 5 ° In essence, the handler expressed
the position that while the government will do its best within reason to protect
juvenile informants, the child assumes the risk of informing, and if harmed in the
process, it is not the government's responsibility. 1
The broad-sweeping adolescent maturity claim has been challenged by the
Supreme Court. In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court, citing scientific data,
significantly undercut the rationale for treating juveniles as adults for criminal
147. This rationale-that teenagers are able to make decisions equally as well as adults and so therefore are
competent to decide to inform-wholeheartedly embraces the personhood jurisprudential approach to children.
See Osther, supra note 8, at 118-20. In the juvenile delinquency context, personhood and autonomy theories are
used to support the conclusion that children are competent to waive their Miranda rights. See Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707, 724, 726 (1979) (holding that there is no special protection for Miranda waivers by children
because they are potentially competent); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 650 (1979) (applying the mature
minor doctrine to the abortion context). Additionally, the recent trend toward waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction
in favor of adult criminal court jurisdiction is rationalized by the claim that children are competent decision-
makers who have chosen to engage in criminal activities warranting their treatment like adults. Cf. Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 618-19 (2005) (J. Scalia, dissenting) (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374
(1989)) ("[lIt is absurd to think that one must be mature enough to drive carefully, drink responsibly, or to vote
intelligently, in order to be mature enough to understand that murdering another human being is profoundly
wrong, and to conform one's conduct to that most minimal of all civilized standards.").
148. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence, A Developmental Perspective on
Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINoOGY 137, 158-59 (1997) (discussing claim that, by about
fourteen years of age, juveniles have similar cognitive decision-making capacity as adults).
149. Dodge, supra note 45, at 241; see also Fare, 442 U.S. at 726 (approving Miranda waiver by a juvenile
who was sixteen-and-a-half-years-old and had "considerable experience with the police").
150. Bradley, supra note 33.
151. Id. (quoting an officer: "My responsibility with Miss Paz was to provide her with a safe place to live and
food and sustenance .... The burden of personal safety falls upon the witness,"); Dodge, supra note 45, at 242
(quoting an officer: "We always run the risk that people will discover the source because kids are stupid. If the
perpetrator does find out, it is most often the kid's fault for bragging to all of his friends about his undercover
adventures with the police."); Pfeifer et al., supra note 32 (quoting an officer commenting on the death of a
juvenile informant: "It's a risk they take ... . They know it in the back of their minds. And we take every
precaution we can with our informants. We don't throw them to the wolves with their eyes closed. I feel bad about
it. But I don't fee [sic] responsible for it.").
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justice purposes. 52 The Court's holding that invalidated laws authorizing the
death penalty for children was premised in part on science demonstrating juve-
niles' immature decision-making capacity, limited life experience, low risk aver-
sion, increased impulsivity, and emphasis on short term gains rather than a
balancing of long and short term behavioral consequence.
1 53
Likewise, social science data undercut the claim that, by virtue of their criminal
history and experience, some juveniles are as savvy as adults and should be treated
as such in the criminal justice system. To varying degrees, juveniles have difficulty
adequately understanding Miranda warnings to intelligently and knowingly waive
their Miranda rights. 154 With limited exceptions, they do not adequately under-
stand the utility and import of the rights to counsel and silence.1 55 Children do not
necessarily understand the operation of the criminal adjudicatory process.1 56
Moreover, prior exposure to the justice system does not necessarily translate to
greater understanding of the process.' 57 Thus, social science data suggests that
even children who have experience with the juvenile or criminal justice system
may lack adult levels of understanding regarding the criminal process.
Finally, the adultification of children also stands in tension with the general legal
incapacity of children. Arguably, for children otherwise viewed as the equivalent
of adults, many categorical, age-based restrictions should fall to the wayside, such
as the minimum drinking age, voting age, age for military service, marital
minimum age, contracting age, and age for jury service. Instead, regardless of their
adultification in the criminal justice context, society maintains that children as a
class should not engage in these activities because they are incapable of properly
exercising these important privileges and rights.
c. Promotes Rehabilitation
Some police officers allege that informing promotes the rehabilitation of
children involved in criminal activities.158 It is claimed that the child who acts as
an informant may develop increased self-esteem, accept greater responsibility,
repent for past conduct, and learn from mistakes. 15 9 Consequently, a child
informant is less likely to re-offend. Even if the child does not develop internal
152. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-75 (holding that juveniles are ineligible for the death penalty).
153. Id. at 568-74.
154. See GRisso, supra note 42, at 90-93.
155. Id. at 128-30. The exception is for those children who have a lengthy history of prior serious offenses and
commensurate exposure to the court system. Id. at 128. These juveniles had the understanding typical of adults.
Id.
156. "Current evidence suggests that compared with adults, youths under age fifteen are at greater risk of
having a poor knowledge of matters related to their participation in trials. For adolescents fifteen and older, on
average their understanding may be more like that of adults." Thomas Grisso, Youths' Capacities, in YoUTH ON
TuAL 139, 152 (Thomas Grisso ed., 2000).
157. GRisso, supra note 42, at 91.
158. See also Simons, supra note 8, at 33-41 (advancing a similar argument in relation to adult informants).
159. See Dodge, supra note 45, at 241(quoting officers' descriptions of "positive aspects" of informing).
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controls as a result of the experience, officers maintain that informing will create
external limits on future criminal conduct. In particular, they reason that a child
who informs is often forcibly expelled from criminal cohorts, making it more
difficult to engage in criminal activities in the future.' 60 Children who inform are
thus required to find others to befriend, preferably and usually those not involved
in criminal activities.
Claims that juveniles can be rehabilitated by informing fail to take into account
that using children as informants may violate prohibitions on contributing to the
delinquency of a minor and sending minors to immoral places. 161 When govern-
ment personnel send juveniles out to gather incriminating information, the juve-
niles are exposed to and may engage in additional criminal activity thereby
undermining any rehabilitative gains. Additionally, as discussed in the next
section, using children as informants exposes them to other harms from which they
arguably should be protected, possibly undermining any rehabilitation that may
have occurred.
2. Through the Eyes of a Child
At present, government actors appear to give short-shrift to the risks a child
informant assumes. Informing is an inherently dangerous activity. Juvenile infor-
mants are exposed to physical, ethical, intra-family, and psychological harms
during their highly formative years. 162 Utilizing a child-centered perspective, this
section posits harms that the government, as child protector, ideally should balance
against the benefits of informing.1 6 3
160. See Markon & Glod, supra note 5 (noting a juvenile informant's experience losing her gang friends after
informing). When law enforcement asked Brenda Paz why she was cooperating against her gang family, she
reportedly responded that it was "a way out. It's a way to start turning the corner .... Either I help you put these
people away and I don't have anyone to hang out with and I'm forced to find new friends. Or they kill me." Id.
161. See Sinclair& Herbert, supra note 8, at 35-39; Ransom, supra note 8, at 109-11; Santiago, supra note 8, at
784-92.
162. In addition to a child-centered perspective, this Article's discussion of children's concerns is suggestive of
a therapeutic jurisprudence lens. See generally David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17
T.M. CooLEy L. REv. 125 (2000). The severity of the harms may vary with the age of the child, the nature of the
informer activities, and the nature of the crime being investigated. Without delving into the particular variables,
this section describes those harms.
163. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'Rights, 14
CARDOzo L. REv. 1747, 1838 (1993) (proposing that children's needs and experiences should be the lens through
which parental rights and responsibilities should be considered). Woodhouse notes the following:
[We] must apply adult intelligence to examine children's status in law and move children from the
margin to the center of formal legal analysis. Adults must begin to ask "the child question"- how
have children's experiences and values been left out of the law? How does the mismatch between
children's experiences and law's assumptions and imposed structures serve the interests of those
who hold power over children? In an ideal world, what would the life situation of children look
like and how could law play a role in bringing this ideal world about?
Id. (footnote omitted).
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a. Physical Harm
Because of their relationships with and physical proximity to the target, juvenile
informants may be especially susceptible to physical harm or death at the hands of
individuals seeking to intimidate or eliminate them. Children who inform on their
parents, other family members, or close friends are unlikely to or unable to avoid
these individuals or sever these close relationships. For example, Brenda Paz was
killed by members of her gang "family" from whom she could not permanently
separate, even though she entered federal witness protection.'64 Similarly, because
of their daily living patterns and inability to relocate on their own, children are
commonly in close proximity to neighbors, peers, and community members,
including criminals, who might physically harm them. 
165
In addition to the likelihood of emotional closeness and physical proximity to a
target, underage informants may not exercise appropriate restraint in conducting
their informant activities, leading to physical harm. Again, Brenda Paz could not
emotionally separate from her gang "family." Reportedly, she knew that maintain-
ing contact with them could lead to her death if her informant status was revealed,
but did not appreciate the amount of physical risk in which she had placed
herself. 166 Also, Chad MacDonald was killed by drug dealers when he tried to set
up a drug bust for the police without their awareness. 167 The inabilities of juveniles
to safeguard themselves may be attributable to their decreased risk aversion.
168
b. Psychological and Ethical Harm
Anticipating the physical harm that often attends informing may cause a range
of psychological trauma including fear, paranoia, anxiety and depression. Simi-
larly, juvenile informants who are actually intimidated may suffer emotionally.
Children who inform face many varieties of intimidation, including verbal threats
of violence, being followed or stalked, and vandalism. 169 They may be intimidated
164. Markon & Glod, supra note 5. See footnote 37 for speculation as to why she may not have been able to
permanently separate.
165. See PETER FINN & KERRY MuRPHY HEALEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING GANG- AND DRUo-
RELATED WNEsS INTIMIDATION 9 (1996) (explaining why juveniles are vulnerable to witness intimidation,
including inability to relocate and susceptibility to family and peer pressure); cf WITmAN & DAVIS, supra note 6,
at 23-25, 37 (reporting that witness intimidation often occurs in public places or schools). Indeed, children merely
suspected of being informants are in physical danger. Criminals in fourteen-year-old Jahkema Princess Hansen's
neighborhood in the District of Columbia killed her because they believed that she had incriminating information
to tell the police about them. See Tucker, supra note 7.
166. Markon & Glod, supra note 5.
167. MacDonald v. City of Brea Police Dep't, No. G028372, 2002 WL 1650018, *34 (Cal. Ct. App. July 23,
2002).
168. See Dodge, supra note 45, at 236 (discussing juvenile informants as "more gullible and higher risk takers"
than their adult counterparts); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569. (2005) ("It has been noted that
'adolescents are overrepresented statistically in virtually in every category of reckless behavior."' (quoting J.
Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992))).
169. WHmcrAN & DAVIS, supra note 6, at 24.
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by friends, family, or acquaintances. 1 70 It is to be expected that intimidation may
cause psychological harms to children. Indeed, by its very nature, intimidation is
intended to cause fear and apprehension.
Even underage informants who do not face physical danger or witness intimida-
tion may suffer emotional trauma. Juveniles do not like informants and let them
know this through ostracization or stigmatization that takes the form of shunning,
teasing, or exclusion. 171 It is well known, however, that peer acceptance is
extremely important to juveniles; they do not want to be excluded or distrusted.
Juvenile informants who are ostracized by their peers may experience emotional
trauma such as withdrawal, depression, and anxiety to anger and acting out.
Underage informants may also suffer in their ethical development. Children
who are returned to the street to gather information passively about others or
engage in undercover operations are thrust back into a criminal environment. In.
such a scenario, the juvenile is provided an opportunity to be educated about or
commit additional criminal conduct, and he may take advantage of the opportuni-
ty.
1 7 2
Juvenile informants may not learn accountability. By informing in exchange for
absolution or leniency, children may learn that they can avoid responsibility for
wrongful behavior by "working it off." As a result, they may continue to commit
additional crimes, expecting that they will continue to avoid liability. 173
An unhealthy sense of self-interest and self-preservation may result from
informing. In their efforts to recruit children to inform, law enforcement officers
and prosecutors may exploit power differentials. Children may be-or feel as if
they have been-"coeiced" into informing, either by the circumstances generally
or the particular recruitment tactics of law enforcement and prosecutors. 174 Using
their authority and adult statuses, government officials obtain agreements that may
170. See FIN & HEALEY, supra note 165, at 9 (explaining why juveniles are vulnerable to witness
intimidation, including inability to relocate and susceptibility to family and peer pressure).
171. See WHrrMAN & DAVIS, supra note 6, at 24; Judi Villa, Who's the school snitch? Alertrecall.com, THE
ARiz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 4,2005, http:/lwww.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/lOO4alertO4.html (explain-
ing that, according to a high school senior, "being labeled a snitch is one of the worst things that can happen. 'You
get excluded and people want to fight you .... You become a snitch and nobody likes you anymore. That's the
Number 1 rule in high school. You don't do it."').
172. See N.J. JUVENILE GuiDELINEs, supra note 83, atA10-4 ("[E]nforcement officers should avoid introducing
the juvenile to offenders or conduct which might immerse the juvenile more deeply in a criminal or delinquent
culture.").
173. Cf Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 8, at 687-88 (describing how informants continue to commit criminal
activities while out in the community).
174. See Dodge, supra note 45, at 234 (describing power differential between law enforcement officers and
informants); cf In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 51-52 (1967). The court in Gault commented:
[I]t seems probable that where children are induced to confess by "paternal" urgings on the part of
officials and the confession is then followed by disciplinary action, the child's reaction is likely to
be hostile and adverse-the child may well feel that he has been led or tricked into confession and
that despite his confession, he is being punished.
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be bad for the child informant, although beneficial for the government. 175 Conse-
quently, underage informants may come to learn that vulnerable individuals are a
means to an end to be sacrificed for "the greater good" or to achieve self-interested
goals, regardless of the consequences to those individuals. 1
76
Child informants may develop an unhealthy distrust of law enforcement and
other authority figures. This perspective may result from the undue influence
government officials exert in an effort to gain cooperation. Juvenile-police
interactions that are considered coercive, harassing, over-reaching, or otherwise
unfair contribute to negative attitudes toward law enforcement among juveniles.177
Additionally, when children do inform, they may become distrustful if they feel
that government authorities are not doing enough to protect them from retribution.
Finally, children who inform may learn to tell individuals, especially police and
other authority figures, what they want to hear. Police and prosecutors surely will
react more favorably to child informants who greatly facilitate their investigations
and prosecutions. Children are likely to be aware of this. Thus, in the extreme, a
child informant may intentionally fabricate or shade information. 178 More mildly,
it may mean that children, who are particularly suggestible, unintentionally




When children act as informants without parental notice or approval, the
parental child-rearing right, duty, and function are infringed, potentially causing
family disharmony. Parents are primarily responsible for making or assisting their
children in making major life decisions, including legal decisions.' 80 The decision
175. In other circumstances, bargains resulting from such power differentials would be void. See RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 177 (1981).
176. See Blair, supra note 9 ("What it teaches-to become a betrayer, to become a seducer, to become a tra itor
to the trust of other people-is certainly a bad thing to teach to young people.").
177. See Patrick J. Carr et al., We Never Call the Cops and Here is Why: A Qualitative Examination of Legal
Cynicism in Three Philadelphia Neighborhoods, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 445, 457-58. (2007); Terrance J. Taylor et al.,
Coppin'an attitude: Attitudinal differences among juveniles toward police, 29 J. CRIM. JUST. 295, 302 (2001).
178. It is well-documented that adult informants will fabricate information. For example, snitch cases
accounted for 45.9% of the 111 death row exonerations since capital punishment was resumed in the 1970s. RoB
WARDEN, NoRTHwEsTERN UNIV. SCl. OF LAW, CTE. ON WRONGFUL CoNvIcIONs, THE SNnm SYSTEM: How
SNrrCH T)STIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OtER INNOCENT AMERIcANS TO DEATH Row 3 (2004), http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/issues/causesandremedies/snitches/.
179. This Article does not address the reliability ofjuvenile informants and their impact on the criminal justice
process. For such research, see generally Tamar Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating after Roper v.
Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 413-14 (2008) (discussing studies of the suggestibility of child
witnesses).
180. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979). The Bellotti Court discussed limits placed on children,
stating:
mhe States validly may limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of
important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences. These rulings have been
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to act as an informant is a legal decision with significant legal ramifications. Thus,
parents arguably should assist their child in making the decision to inform if the
need arises. Furthermore, parents are responsible for instilling moral standards and
good citizenship in their children.' 81 To the extent that informing is viewed as
morally appropriate and good citizenship, parents arguably should be involved in
the decision-making process. Parents who do not have an opportunity to play a role
in this decision may feel as if their child has acted improperly without parental
permission. Finally, parents are tasked with protecting their children. When not
included in their child's decision to inform, they may feel that they have not been
given an adequate chance to ensure the child's safety.
Parents who are provided an opportunity to be involved in their child's decision
to inform may find themselves in a no-win situation which may be troubling to the
parent. On one hand, the parent who encourages her child to inform may place the
child in a perilous or harmful situation. Conversely, the parent who does not
support informing may subject the child to greater criminal repercussions or may
feel as if she is not modeling appropriate citizenship. Parents who are internally
conflicted about the situation may bring stress to the family situation.182
Lastly, when there is a conflict between parent and child as to whether the child
should inform, the child's relationship with his parents and family may be
strained. 183 Parents encourage their children to cooperate with law enforcement
inquiries for a number of different reasons. It might be the case that the
encouragement is done out of the parent's civic-mindedness, respect for authority,
law-abidingness, desire to reclaim their community from crime, or other similar
concerns, and the parent wants to instill those values in her child. Perhaps the
parent or someone close to the parent is the victim. Or perhaps a parent wants their
child to inform to facilitate expulsion from a group of criminal-minded cohorts or
to receive criminal leniency. These examples suggest positive motivations. Alter-
grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors
often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them.
Id.
181. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) ("The duty to prepare the child for 'additional
obligations,' referred to by the Court, must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs,
and elements of good citizenship.").
182. See, e.g., Pfeifer et al., supra note 32 (quoting father of Gregory "Sky" Erickson, a juvenile informant
who was murdered, as stating: "I feel responsible because I talked him into this .... There's just a lot of people
that miss the hell out of him.").
183. The following discussion is based on research regarding parent-child interactions during police question-
ing of juveniles. For an in-depth discussion of the potential conflicts between a parent and child in the
interrogation context, see Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial Interroga-
tions: Friend or Foe?, 41 AM. CniM. L. REV. 1277, 1291-98 (2004). See also GRisso, supra note 42, at 180-86
(detailing empirical studies regarding advice parents would give their children respecting their right to remain
silent during police questioning). To date, no such research exists with respect to juvenile informants and their
parents.
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natively, a parent's encouragement may not have the child's interests at the
forefront. For example, a parent may encourage cooperation because of the
parent's embarrassment or anger at the child's criminal conduct, or because of her
own inability or unwillingness to resist coercive authority figures or conduct, or
out of ignorance of the child's legal rights.
In any of these scenarios, if the child refuses or is hesitant to inform despite the
parents' desire for him to do so, there is the immediate potential to cause general
discord in the home or family that in turn could be psychologically and emotion-
ally damaging to the child and the family. Moreover, in the long-term, a child who
half-heartedly informs due to parental pressure and does so unsuccessfully might
generate physical retribution from the target. As discussed earlier, this outcome
may cause the parent trauma.
In contrast to the parent who encourages the child to inform, some parents may
not want their child to inform, despite the potential benefits that may accrue to the
child. 184 This scenario also has the potential to cause familial disharmony. The
parent may primarily be concerned with the child's physical safety or other
negative repercussions of informing. The parent may also desire to protect the
suspect, who may be the parent him or herself or another individual close to him or
her. Perhaps the parent may not trust law enforcement or the criminal justice
system, or the parent may simply want the child who is subject to criminal charges
to face those charges without leniency. Regardless of the reason, the child who
informs despite parental objection may cause family disharmony and strain by
challenging the parent's authority and guidance.
The government has seemingly broken its traditionally protective stance toward
children and adopted a warrior-like approach to dealing with drugs, crime, and
gangs. As a consequence, the harms to child informants arising from informing,
including physical, ethical, and psychological injuries and family tension, have
been ignored or minimized by government investigators and prosecutors. Instead,
the government unquestioningly prioritizes its interests in using underage infor-
mants to obtain successful criminal investigation and prosecution over children's
interests in government protection, resulting in the unchecked use of child
informants. The concerns of child informants should be measured against and,
where substantial enough, at times possibly trump, the interests of other societal
stakeholders. Tempering the decision to use underage informants by reference to
the long-standing parens patriae doctrine provides a measure of protection for
juveniles.
184. See GRisso, supra note 42, at 181-82.
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III. DRAW DOWN: MODEL APPROACHES TO CURTAILING THE USE OF JUVENILE
INFORMANTS
A. Model #1: A Categorical Rule
Jurisdictions could institute a categorical age prohibition on the use of underage
informants. With some exception, children under the age of eighteen years are
generally restricted from engaging in many (often dangerous) activities without
parental consent. In most cases, they are also prohibited from making legally-
consequential decisions without parental consent. Acting as an informant is a
dangerous endeavor having significant legal consequences. Thus, it is reasonable
to impose categorical age restrictions on the use of juvenile informants with
exceptions for parental consent. Such restrictions are justified by a child's
diminished capacity and inherent vulnerability.1 8 5 Three sources of law support
age-based prohibitions on the use of underage informants: the general age of legal
majority in the United States; age restrictions for American military service; and
international age restrictions on child soldiers. Collectively, these sources of law
suggest that children less than seventeen years of age should not be permitted to
act as informants and children seventeen to eighteen years of age may only do so
when parental consent is obtained.
186
1. The Rationale
The general age of legal majority offers one approach to limiting the use of
underage informants. Instituting an absolute prohibition on the use of individuals
under the age of eighteen as informants, without parental consent, is consistent
with the general treatment accorded juveniles respecting legal abilities. It is
axiomatic that individuals younger than eighteen years of age are legally disabled.
Generally, they may not vote, serve on a jury, or marry.187 Parents are usually
entitled to consent on behalf of the child for receipt of medical treatment. 88
Juveniles who enter into contracts may later void them at their request.1 89 When an
individual reaches the age of eighteen years, childhood ends as a legal matter and
adult legal status is attained. The parent no longer has authority over the child and
the state no longer assumes a protective role. With few limitations, individuals
over eighteen years of age have the unfettered ability to make decisions of a legal
185. See supra Part I.D for a discussion of age restrictions and parental consent requirements adopted by some
jurisdictions with respect to juvenile informants.
186. Whether parental consent should ever be sufficient is beyond the scope of this Article.
187. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 581-87 (2005) (listing examples of state statutes establishing the
minimum age to vote).
188. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (upholding statute requiring
parental or judicial approval for a minor's abortion); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-04 (1979) (holding parents
have authority to seek their child's commitment to a mental health institution).
189. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNrRAcrs § 14 (1981) ("[T]he modern rule in the absence of statute is
that they are voidable by the infant.").
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nature. Accordingly, because of their general legal disability, individuals under
eighteen years of age could be prohibited from engaging in informant activities
without parental consent.
In light of the war rhetoric underlying the use of underage informants, reference
to military and war restrictions on juvenile service may be appropriate, although
admittedly inflammatory to some.' 90 The American government statutorily prohib-
its children younger than seventeen years of age from enlisting in the American
military.1 9t Children between seventeen and eighteen years of age may enlist with
parental or guardian consent, if a parent or guardian is entitled to custody and
control.1 92 Such children, however, may not be stationed in active combat.
193
Applying American military enlistment standards to the question of child infor-
mants dictates that children under the age of seventeen should not serve as
informants. For children over the age of seventeen, the government should be
required to obtain parental consent.
The international treatment of child soldiers offers a similar rationale for
imposing categorical age restrictions on the use of underage informants. The use of
children as soldiers in active combat is well-documented in the international
setting. 194 As a result, international standards have been adopted, setting the age of
participation of individuals in war activities at eighteen years, though individuals
younger than eighteen-years-old may be recruited. 195 There is no exception in this
scheme for parental approval. International standards suggest that governments
and law enforcement officials should not use individuals under the age of eighteen
'190. Some scholars have suggested that the metaphorical war on drugs has become an actual war. See HEATH,
supra note 118, at 281-82. Carrying war rhetoric to its fullest extent, an underage informant arguably may be
metaphorically characterized as a "child soldier" for the American government.
191. 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2006).
192. Id.; see Major John T. Rawcliffe, Child Soldiers: Legal Obligations and U.S. Implementation, 2007 ARMY
LAW. 1, 3-4 (2007). Approximately 4% of new enlistees are seventeen years of age at the time they arrive at basic
training. Id. at 3.
193. 10 U.S.C. § 505(a).
194. Many nations in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America use child soldiers in wars. See
U.S. STATE DEP'T, THE FAcrs ABoUT CHID SoLDIERS (2005), http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/2005/50941.htm
[hereinafter U.S. STATE DEP'T]. For more extensive information on child soldiers, visit Coalition to Stop the Use
of Child Soldiers, www.child-soldiers.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2009), or Human Rights Watch, www.humanrights-
watch.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
195. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions art. 77, (Jun. 8, 1977) (Parties must "take all feasible
measures in order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take direct part in hostilities"
and may recruit children between the ages of fifteen and seventeen years. The U.S. is not a party.); see also
Additional Protocol Id to the Geneva Conventions art. 4 (Jun. 8, 1977); Optional Protocol to the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (May 25, 2000)
(prohibiting drafting of children under age eighteen years; requiring states "take all feasible measures" to ensure
those under eighteen years of age "do not take a direct part in hostilities." Children under eighteen years of age
may not be voluntarily recruited unless certain procedural requirements are satisfied. U.S. satisfied procedures to
recruit those who are seventeen years of age.); Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989) (children under fifteen years of age may not be recruited or
participate in armed conflict. The U.S. is not a party.).
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as informants in any circumstances.
Grafting the age standards of the American military and international law onto
the context of child informants, while an imperfect fit, is nonetheless appropriate.
In terms of function, among other activities, soldiers and other personnel may act
as spies gathering information.1 96 Child informants likewise act essentially as
spies or human intelligence sources. Further, the risks of physical and emotional
harm to child informants are not unlike the risks to soldiers, particularly those
under the age of eighteen. 1
97
2. The Pros and Cons
The benefits of using a categorical method are several. Unqualified age
limitations are easily administered and predictably applied.1 98 The approach is
consistent with the age at which children generally are permitted to make
legally-significant decisions. 99 These two benefits may be particularly important
because the characteristics of the class of child informants are currently un-
known."° Requiring parental consent for seventeen to eighteen year-olds main-
tains the authority and duty of parents respecting child-rearing. 20' As well,
requiring parental approval is consistent with the juvenile justice system's prefer-
ence for parental involvement. 20 2 Lastly, an age-based approach is consistent with
the state's protective stance respecting children.20 3
The critiques of a categorical method are also numerous, however. First, the rule
does not consider the public's general interest in safety or particularized interest in
resolving certain types of crimes. If categorical age restrictions are imposed, in a
substantial number of cases, the government might lose beneficial information and
196. U.S. STATE DEP'T, supra note 194.
197. A third potential justification is that the children in foreign nations who become child soldiers are not
vastly unlike the children who act as informants for the American government. Both are often poor, homeless,
parentless, and have limited access to information. Moreover, both child soldiers and child informants agree to
serve for similar reasons: fear, economic need, or the desire to protect oneself or one's family. See Coalition to
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Some Facts, http://www.child-soldiers.org/childsoldiers/some-facts (last visited
Apr. 6, 2009); Human Rights Watch, Facts About Child Soldiers, http://hrw.org/campaigns/crp/fact-sheet.html
(last visited Apr. 6,2009). Indeed, some have argued that juvenile gang members in America are similar to foreign
child soldiers and should be treated as such. See generally Elizabeth Braunstein, Are Gang Members, Like Other
Child Soldiers, Entitled to Protection from Prosecution under International Law?, 3 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. &
POL'Y 75 (1999). Juvenile gang members, and others involved in criminal activity, obviously may have the best
likelihood of becoming informants. The similarities are unexplored in this Article.
198. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-4 n.23 (1979); Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of
Adolescence, HoFsTRA L. REv. 547, 561 (2000).
199. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) ("The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line
for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.").
200. See supra Part I.C.
201. Scott, supra note 198, at 560-61.
202. See Kristin Henning, It Takes a Lawyer to Raise a Child?: Allocating Responsibilities among Parents,
Children, and Lawyers in Delinquency Cases, 6 NEv. L.J. 836, 843 (2006) ("Proponents of family-focused
juvenile justice strategies believe first, that families are in the best position to rehabilitate children ... .
203. Scott, supra note 198, at 547-48.
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testimony.
Second, children absolutely will not receive the benefits of informing, whether
tangible or intangible. A juvenile facing delinquency or criminal charges, without
receiving the benefit of criminal leniency in exchange for informing, will be
significantly disadvantaged in the present criminal case. In future cases, the child's
sentence may be enhanced owing to prior offenses that were not ameliorated.
Juveniles charged as adults would not have the opportunity to obtain criminal
leniency despite facing serious penalties. Children who might be rehabilitated as a
result of informing will not have a chance at rehabilitation, and children who are
not permitted to inform may continue to be subjected to crime in their home or in
their community.
Third, the approach is both over- and under-inclusive.2° Mature children should
have the right to make legal decisions with "grave and indelible" consequences. °5
Nevertheless, the categorical approach treats equally very young children (e.g.,
nine-year-olds), who undoubtedly suffer from diminished capacity, and possibly
mature adolescents (e.g., sixteen-year-olds). Similarly, some minors may be
developmentally mature enough to handle the benefits and burdens of cooperating,
while others may not be mature enough until after the age of eighteen.20 6
Fourth, child informants who have valuable information and would otherwise
be permitted to testify to that information would be unavailable. Youth generally
does not serve as an absolute, insurmountable bar to an individual's provision of
evidence.207 Thus, a prohibition on juvenile informants serving as witnesses would
be inconsistent with the presumption that child witnesses can provide important
and reliable evidence.
Sixth, vesting approval or disapproval in parents may cause additional con-
cerns. 20 8 At times, a parent's consent or non-consent may conflict with the child's
desire or interest. Similarly, a parent may consent without herself fully understand-
ing the implications of the child's participation in informant activities. 20 9 Lastly, a
categorical approach may encourage criminal-minded individuals, particularly
adults, to utilize juveniles for their criminal gain because the juvenile would not be
able to provide incriminating information to the government. For the same reason,
204. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 ("The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an
individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already retained levels of maturity some adults will
never reach.").
205. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (stating that minors should have the right to make important
decisions that wili have "grave and indelible" consequences).
206. See Scott, supra note 198, at 559-60 (2000). Some researchers have concluded that children who have
reached age fourteen or fifteen years have adult-like decision-making capacity. Accepting this premise as true
suggests that setting the standard at eighteen years is too high.
207. See FED. R. Evm. 601; see also CMToroaOPHER B. Mua.ER & LAnm C. KnuKPATRICK, FEDERAL EviDENCE
§ 6.2 (3d ed. 2003).
208. See supra Part H.C.2.c. This Article does not seek to resolve whether a parent should rightly possess the
absolute authority to make what may be a life-or-death choice for the child.
209. Henning, supra note 202, at 851-52.
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such an approach may encourage juveniles to engage in criminal activities.
B. Model #2: Prior Judicial Approval
A more flexible alternative to the bright-line age restriction is to require law
enforcement and prosecutors to obtain judicial approval prior to using a child as an
informant. 210 What follows is a rough procedure to obtain review and two
proposals for standards of approval that could be applied by courts. First, courts
could apply the best interests of the child standard to determine whether to
authorize a child to become an informant. Alternatively, courts could determine
whether a minor is both capable and willing to give informed consent. If so, then
the minor would be permitted to make his own decision whether to inform. In
either instance, judicial approval does not mandate that the child cooperate, but
only results in a determination that the benefits outweigh the burdens for the child
or that the child is sufficiently mature and informed to decide to consent. Although
a court might approve a child to act as an informant or make the choice to do so,
this does not necessarily mean that the child will do so. Of his own volition, the
child may nevertheless refuse to assist the government.
1. Procedural Matters
There are several procedural matters to take into account. First, when govern-
ment authorities desire to use a child as an informant and the child has expressed
interest in doing so, the authorities should expeditiously present the matter to a
judge for review. Additionally, they should present any subsequent change in
earlier approved circumstances (e.g., nature of informant activities) to the judge
for approval.
The appropriate judge to give approval may be one of many. Juvenile judges are
well-positioned, as are family court judges. Both are experienced in making
decisions pertaining generally to children and scrutinizing child witnesses in
particular. They may, however, not have extensive prior experience dealing with
informant issues. Criminal court judges usually have substantial experience
dealing with informants. They may not, however, have substantial experience
resolving children's issues, but may have experience with issues pertaining to child
witnesses.
Regardless of the particular assigned judge's usual subject matter, the judge
should be available immediately or as soon as possible to consider the matter. The
opportunity to inform is often time-sensitive.21 Information may become stale if
210. See supra Part I.D for a discussion of California's statute, which adopts such an approach in addition to
setting age-based restrictions.
211. A delay of several weeks or even a few days to appear before a judge and conduct a hearing may make the
potential informant's information stale. The child's informant opportunity thus expires, and any expected benefits
for the child and the public will not be obtained.
1180 [Vol. 46:1145
HeinOnline -- 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1180 2009
COLLATERAL DAMAGE
not acted upon quickly. Thus, for immediate review, an "on duty" or "chambers"
judge may be the best option.
The judge assigned to the matter should conduct a hearing in chambers or in a
sealed courtroom. At the hearing, the court should take recorded testimony from, at
a minimum: the child; the child's parent(s); the child's mental health provider or
counselor, if one exists; and the law enforcement agent(s) handling the case. The
purpose of the testimony is to determine each party's position on the issue and
satisfaction of one of the standards proposed herein.
A prosecutor should attend the hearing to represent the government's position. If
the juvenile is too young to adequately express his point-of-view and participate in
representation, the court should appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child's
interests. If the juvenile is older or facing juvenile delinquency or criminal charges,
then either the child's parents should retain an attorney for the child or the court
should appoint the child an attorney. In either instance, the attorney should
represent the child's wishes.
All materials related to the matter should be kept confidential. Thus, in addition
to the hearing taking place in chambers or a sealed courtroom, the transcript should
be sealed. All parties should be advised that breaches of confidentiality, intentional
or otherwise, are subject to contempt of court.
The court should apply a clear and convincing evidentiary standard in making
its decision. This standard is appropriate because it avoids the risk of error posed
by a preponderance standard which is too substantial in light of the serious
ramifications of the decision. Moreover, the standard is appropriate because it
recognizes the countervailing parental and state interests.212
Finally, the court may determine, against the desires of the child or the
government, to deny the request. In such a case, the child should be permitted to
take an immediate appeal on the record. The record on appeal must also be held in
confidence.
2. Proposed Standard #1: The Best Interests of the Child
Consistent with the government's traditional protector role respecting children,
the "best interests of the child" (BIC) test provides one standard of approval for
authorities considering the use of an underage informant. The BIC standard is
woven through much of the scholarly discourse, jurisprudence, and practical
decision-making pertaining to children in the legal system. Parents are presumed
and expected to act in the BIC when exercising their fundamental rights to raise
their child.213 The government, in its parens patriae role, acts in the BIC.214 The
BIC standard is the touchstone of the juvenile delinquency and child maltreatment
212. Cf Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982) (holding that clear and convincing evidentiary
standard applies to termination of parental rights proceedings).
213. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
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systems, as well as judicial decisions regarding custody, visitation, support, and
adoption.21 5
The BIC standard aspires to protect the physical, psychological, emotional, and
developmental needs of children. Given the varied concerns and interests impacted
by the use of underage informants, a multi-factored approach to resolving the
issue, such as the BIC standard, is arguably appropriate.
To decide whether or not serving as an informant would be in the child's
short-term and long-term best interests, the court should evaluate the following
factors, which may be grouped into two broad categories:
Child's Background and Characteristics:
" Age
" Physical characteristics
* Emotional and psychological maturity
* Current emotional and psychological status, and history
" Present or past (mis)use of drugs or alcohol
* Educational background
* Family and home-life environment, including impact of informing on
family
* Community of residence, including prevalence and instances of witness
intimidation
" Criminal history, if any
* Prior informant activities of the child, if any
Potential Informant Activities:
" Nature of the offense about which child will be informing (e.g., drug crime,
violent crime, non-violent crime, or gang activities)
" How the child or child's information came to the attention of law enforce-
ment or prosecutors
" Identity of target and relationship between target and child (e.g., parent,
family member, custodian, friend, acquaintance, stranger)
" Physical proximity of child to target and target's cohorts
" Reputation of the target and target's cohorts for witness intimidation, and/or
actual instances of such
" Nature of informant activities (e.g., information only, testimony, ongoing
provision of information, controlled buys, undercover activities)
" Nature of informant'agreement (e.g., written or oral)
" Child's reason for and strength of commitment to informing
" Whether the child will receive a benefit for informing
214. Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAm L. REv. 31, 43 (2006) (describing the
state's role in custodial proceedings as well as other proceedings relating to children in which the parents are
presumed to act in the best interests of the child).
215. See id.; see also Simon, supra note 111, at 1405-06.
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o If so, the nature of the benefit the child stands to gain
o If criminal leniency will be received, nature of the offense for which the
child is suspected or charged, whether the child is merely suspected of
illicit activity or probable cause exists to believe the child committed the
crime, and the maximum possible sentence exposure without benefit of
sentence reduction for informing
" Potential for and gravity of physical, emotional, familial, and psychological
harms to child if approved to inform
" Protective measures to be afforded the child, including nature and time-
period
" Presence or absence of parental notice, consultation, and/or consent
" Whether the child has received the advice of counsel
" Assessment of potential impact on public safety, if child does or does not
inform
" Availability or futility of alternative means to obtain similar evidence.
In reaching a decision, the judge should rely on testimony and argument offered
by the various parties at the hearing. The judge should evaluate the above factors in
each child's case to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that
serving as an informant is not in the BIC (i.e., the benefits outweigh the concerns).
If acting as an informant clearly will not be in the BIC, the court should not
approve the informing activities.
3. Proposed Standard #2: Informed Consent by a Mature Minor
Requiring police and prosecutors to obtain a judicial determination that a mature
minor has given informed consent to act as an informant offers another approach.
The mature minor doctrine is frequently utilized in the medical decision-making
context. Generally, minors are not legally permitted to consent to medical
treatment.21 6 Under the mature minor doctrine, however, an older, competent child
may validly consent to routine or emergency medical treatment, or specified types
of medical treatment.21 7 The rationale underlying application of the doctrine is the
recognition that a mature child who is in a vulnerable position should be permitted
to make decisions substantially affecting his or her life.2 18
Applying the mature minor standard to the issue of child informants is
reasonable in light of the similarities of concerns between the two scenarios. Both
situations can benefit the child if successful, but each also offers the potential for
physical, psychological, and emotional harms, even if successful. Furthermore, as
216. See Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate Test ofAutonomy: Should Minors Have a Right to Make Decisions
Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RuTGERS L. REv. 1, 17 (1996) ("Under the current common law and
statutes on health care decisions, there is little, if any, precedent recognizing a minor's right to make
life-sustaining treatment decisions.").
217. Scott, supra note 198, at 567-68.
218. Id. at 568.
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in the medical context, there is often a need for expediency in making the decision
as to whether to inform.
The mature minor doctrine requires that, after a hearing, the court make an
individual determination of the child's maturity.219 Bellotti v. Baird sets out the
general standard for mature minority in the medical context: whether the child is
"mature enough and well enough informed" to make the decision.220 Thus, courts
make two findings. Initially, the court ascertains the child's maturity to make the
decision. The court then makes a finding as to whether the child has given
informed consent.
As to maturity, Professor Jennifer Rosato has suggested factors to be considered
in the context of life-sustaining treatment decisions.221 Adapting the relevant
factors to the underage informant scenario suggests the following factors be
considered:
" The child's age
• The child's performance in school
* The child's understanding of the concept of informing
* The child's scope of experience with informing, whether his own or others'
" The child's understanding and consideration of the risks and benefits of
informing
• The child's reasons for informing
" How the child reached the decision to inform
* Other major legal decisions the child has previously made in the juvenile or
criminal justice context
* The strength of the child's commitment to the decision to inform.222
The court should also consider whether the child has consulted with his parents
and his attorney, and if consultation did not occur, the court should inquire why it
did not take place.223 None of the factors should be dispositive, although a child's
219. Id. at 573-74.
220. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (considering mature minor doctrine in abortion context);
Scott, supra note 198, at 574.
221. Rosato, supra note 216, at 62-65.
222. Id. at 64-65; see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979). The Fare Court held that the
totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver
even where interrogation of juveniles is involved .... The totality approach permits-indeed, it
mandates-inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evalua-
tion of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he
has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights,
and the consequences of waiving those rights.
Id.
223. See generally Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,644 n.23 (1979):
The nature of both the State's interest in fostering parental authority and the problem of
determining "maturity" makes clear why the State generally may resort to objective, though
inevitably arbitrary, criteria such as age limits, marital status .... Not only is it difficult to define,
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age and reticence should be given significant weight.
Next, the court should evaluate whether or not the child has given informed
consent to act as an informant. In the bioethics context, informed consent contains
three elements: information, comprehension, and voluntariness. 224 With respect to
information, in the context of informing, the court should ensure the child
understands:
* The nature of the case about which the child is informing
* The informing efforts required to be undertaken by the child
* The nature of the benefits to be received by informing
* The burdens to be expected by not informing
* The nature of the risks of participation-physical or otherwise, short-term
and long-term, direct and collateral-to himself or others
* The extent of government protection and support to be provided while
informing and thereafter
* The penalties for violating the informant agreement.225
The child should have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the
informant agreement.226 Sufficient time to consult with an attorney should be
allowed, if requested.
Comprehension requires that a child be advised of the above information in
writing and in a manner that is commensurate with his maturity and language
capacities. 227 Thus, a twelve-year-old might require use of different language and
word choices than a seventeen-year-old. If there is an Englishlanguage barrier, a
translator should be involved.228 If necessary, the child should be tested or quizzed
to ascertain comprehension.229
The child's decision to inform must be voluntary and free from coercion and
undue influence. In some instances, the nature of the case requires an incentive
sufficient to induce the child to cooperate.230 Thus, it is difficult to craft a
bright-line rule distinguishing permitted and prohibited influential efforts. At a
let alone determine, maturity, but also the fact that a minor may be very much an adult in some
respects does not mean that his or her need and opportunity for growth under parental guidance
and discipline have ended.
224. THE NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIoMED. AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, THE BELMoNT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLEs AND GUIDELINEs FOR THE PROTECTION OF







230. Indeed, it may be questioned whether an agreement to cooperate is ever truly voluntary. But see Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979) ("The police did indeed indicate that a cooperative attitude would be to
respondent's benefit, but their remarks in this regard were far from threatening or coercive.").
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minimum, the government should not intentionally threaten or intimidate a child or
his family with harm to induce cooperation.2 3 Nor should the government employ
family and close friends to induce cooperation. Finally, law enforcement officers
and prosecutors should not use their positions of authority to command coopera-
tion, except to the extent otherwise lawfully allowed.
2 32
4. The Pros and Cons
Imposing the requirement of judicial approval provides a check on police and
prosecutor zeal. Requiring approval from a neutral judicial entity is preferable to
allowing law enforcement and prosecutors to decide internally whether children
should serve as informants, even when applying a bright line rule. Police and
prosecutor personnel have strong desires to obtain information for investigation
and prosecution, which may undercut adequate consideration of the safety inter-
ests of the child. Thus, placing the decision in the hands of the court system avoids
this concern.
One potential problem with this proposal is that requiring prior judicial approval
imposes financial and administrative costs. If, however, a relatively low number of
cases or "easy" cases are presented for approval using existing judicial systems,
then the increased costs may not be prohibitive. Even if the costs are significant,
over time the costs will likely diminish as the methodology becomes standardized
and judges become more familiar with the issues.
Another concern is that requiring judicial approval still leaves a considerable
amount of discretion within the hands of law enforcement and prosecutors to
decide which cases to present to the court and when to present them. Recall that
some law enforcement and prosecutors take a narrow view of what constitutes an
informant.233 To counteract that concern, jurisdictions should adopt the broad
definition of informant proposed herein.234 At first contact with a child who will
potentially provide information, the government should present the matter to the
judge for approval. The reviewing judge should credit delay in presenting the
issue-whether due to negligence or malfeasance-against approving the infor-
mant activities.
a. Best Interests of the Child Standard
When evaluating the proposed standards for approval of an underage informant,
the application of the BIC standard offers several benefits. First, it is a standard
which many courts are familiar with and have experience applying. Second, the
231. BEu oNr REPORT, supra note 224, at Part C.I.; cf. Fare, 442 U.S. at 727.
232. For example, if a child chose not to inform it would not be coercion for a prosecutor to charge the child
with a more serious crime that the prosecutor could irrespective of cooperation.
233. See supra Part I.C.
234. See supra note 11.
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multi-variable standard allows decision-making flexibility that recognizes the
specific circumstances surrounding a particular child. Moreover, if a judge is
familiar with a child because the child previously has been before the court in a
child welfare proceeding, status case, or delinquency proceedings, then it is
possible that, owing to his familiarity with the child, the judge is actually in a better
position to make a BIC ruling.
The BIC standard, however, has long borne widespread criticism that is equally
applicable in this context.235 Commentators have labeled the standard a "vague
platitude," a legal "euphemism for unbridled judicial discretion," and a "value-
laden, poorly defined standard. ' 236 These labels arise because of the indeterminacy
of the standard and lack of consensus in its application. Whether the standard is
objective or subjective is unclear.237 Similarly, it is unclear from whose perspective
the assessment should be made: the child's, the parent's, the state's, or the court's.238 No
consensus has arisen as to what factors are relevant or pivotal in determining the BIC.239
The aim of the standard is uncertain. Is the aim to ensure that the child has the best
childhood or the best adulthood?2A0 Is the aim of the test to make the child "happy" or
well-adjusted or merely not a burden to society?241 In light of the ambiguity surrounding
the standard, commentators and litigants opine that the standard promotes judicial
unpredictability and fosters self-serving litigation. 242
In addition to the concerns generally attending the BIC standard, an additional
concern arises. The standard is aimed at mitigating government actions; yet, use of
this standard may still permit a prosecutor to have significant control over the
court's BIC determination. If a prosecutor offers significant criminal leniency or
protection, this offer may weigh heavily in the court's decision and overshadow
potential concerns.
235. See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest
Standard, 89 MicH. L. REV. 2215, 2219-25 (1991), for a thorough summary of critiques of the best interests of the
child standard. See also Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. CI. L.
REv. 1, 11-28 (1987).
236. Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 267, 267, 269 (1986) (characterizing the bests interests of the child standard as a "vague platitude"
and "euphemism for unbridled judicial discretion"); LeAnn Larson LaFave, Origins and Evolution of the "Best
Interests of the Child" Standard, 34 S.D. L. Rev. 459, 481 (1989) (explaining that best interests of the child
standard is criticized as vague and amorphous).
237. LaFave, supra note 236, at 481.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 481-86.
240. See Charlow, supra note 236, at 268 (noting that "it is not clear whether the 'best interests of the child'
means a 'happy' childhood or a childhood that leads to a well-adjusted adult regardless of the happiness
experienced").
241. Id.
242. See Charlow, supra note 236, at 270 (self-serving litigation); LaFave, supra note 236, at 497 (unpredict-
able outcomes).
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b. Mature Minor and Informed Consent Standard
The mature minor standard is attractive on a number of levels. First, the flexible,
individualized methodology recognizes that some adolescents are mature enough
to make decisions. As in the medical context, mature children should have a voice
in such a significant personal decision. Second, it allows for protected child
informants when parental consent is unavailable. Third, understanding that at
times parents may improperly encourage or discourage children from informing,
the mature minor approach protects children when the information target is a
parent or close family member or when the parent may not act in the best interests
of the child.243 Fourth, it protects the government's interest in receiving useful
information from children in order to investigate and prosecute crimes. Unlike the
categorical approach, it does not completely eliminate government access to child
informants. So long as the court deems the child mature and finds that the child has
given informed consent, the child is permitted to act as an informant. Finally, it is
consistent with contemporary criminal justice policies that treat many children as
adults. 24
Use of the mature minor doctrine is subject to a number of critiques. First, if a
mature child chooses not to inform or the court concludes that a child is immature
or has not given informed consent, then the same criticisms that arise with respect
to categorical age restrictions are applicable. Second, application of the doctrine
may place children in legal limbo. Those who are deemed mature enough to make
this potentially life-altering decision may not be deemed mature with respect to
other legal matters. Alternatively, those not deemed mature for informing purposes
may still be found capable of waiving Miranda or entering pleas. Third, as with the
BIC standard, reviewing courts may import stereotypes into their decision-
making, make value-laden judgments, or apply paternalistic thinking and substi-
tuted judgment. Fourth, application of the doctrine eliminates parental input and
infringes on parental duty and responsibility to protect the child and instill
values.2 45 Finally, the informed consent and mature minor doctrines arguably do
not properly account for differences between adults and adolescents in making
rational decisions.246 More specifically, they do not determine whether the child
has made a sound decision.
247
C. Plotting the Course
Governments may undertake a number of options to ensure that their use of
243. See Scott, supra note 198, at 567-68 (discussing the mature minor doctrine in the context of beneficial
medical treatment where parental consent is hard to obtain).
244. Id. at 583.
245. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979).
246. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAw & HUM.
BHtAv. 221,224-26 (1995).
247. See id at 224-26.
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underage informants is both limited and regulated. Each of the three proposals
discussed above have benefits and drawbacks. Bright-line rules, such as the
categorical age approach, are comforting in their consistency and ease.of adminis-
tration. They are, though, often overbroad in their application. In contrast, both the
mature minor doctrine and BIC standard are designed to account for the peculiari-
ties of particular situations.
The mature minor doctrine recognizes that informing is often as life-altering and
dangerous as the receipt of medical treatment. Consequently, as in the medical
context, the child should have a voice in such a significant matter. In application,
however, the mature minor, informed consent standard may operate as restrictively
as the categorical age rule.
As between the three models, this Article concludes that the most ideal standard
is prior judicial approval using the BIC standard.248 The BIC standard accounts for
public safety, unlike the categorical age restriction and the mature minor standard.
Children are not completely or virtually eliminated from acting as informants, as
under the categorical age approach. The BIC standard can accommodate concerns
about a juvenile's age, maturity, and capacity to consent. Despite its much
maligned character, the BIC standard makes intuitive sense and is a familiar legal
standard. Finally, the BIC standard allows a neutral third party to determine
whether it would be a sound decision for the child to serve as an informant, rather
than leaving the matter to one invested decision-maker such as the government, a
parent, or the child.
CONCLUSION
Despite the nation's desire to win the wars on drugs, crime, and gangs, children
should not be sacrificed as collateral damage in these wars. The physical and
non-physical harms to children flowing from their use as informants are worrisome
and avoidable. Children are one of society's most vulnerable and impressionable
populations, and they are worthy of serious consideration and protection, even in
the face of challenges to public safety. Thus, the government's use of juveniles as
informants should be rare and highly regulated. Three possible measures may
achieve such a goal: (1) categorically prohibit juveniles from informing unless
they are over seventeen years and have parental consent; (2) require a prior judicial
finding that such service is in the best interests of the child; or (3) require prior
judicial approval, utilizing a mature minor informed consent standard. This Article
contends that the second proposal most appropriately balances the public's interest
248. This Article takes no position on whether this measure should be independently adopted by law
enforcement and prosecutor agencies or established through the legislative process. Arguably, law enforcement
and prosecutors have more experience and familiarity with the issue; thus, they are in a better position to adopt
policies. Additionally, self-regulation may be preferred. On the other hand, police and prosecutors arguably have a
stronger interest in investigation and prosecution than protecting children; thus, democratic adoption of
regulations through the legislative process may better serve the public's interest.
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in safety and the concerns of children and provides for accountability.
Admittedly, severely limiting the use of children as informants has the potential
of negatively impacting current law enforcement and prosecutorial efforts, Police
and prosecutorial agencies relying on information from children may have
difficulty resolving cases without benefit of such information. Such difficulties
may lead to an increase in crime that in turn negatively affects public safety,
including children's safety. Ideally, however, agencies would be motivated by
limitations on using underage informants to develop less harmful investigative and
prosecutorial strategies that shield children to the fullest extent possible. This
likely will not be an easy endeavor, but it will be worthwhile. The resulting effects
hopefully will be less crime, better investigations and prosecutions, maintenance
of individual and communal confidence in law enforcement and prosecutors, and
improved child safety.
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